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with the UK’s retail energy market. Using survey data from the UK energy regulator we find that 
while intermediaries are central to MSBs switching energy supplier, the quantity of marketing 
contact received from them is a key source of dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction with marketing 
contact has direct policy relevance as the Competition and Market Authority’s 2016 Energy 
Market Investigation recommended that a database of ‘disengaged’ MSBs be established to 
enable marketing communications from rival suppliers to prompt MSBs to switch. We also query 
whether the need for more MSB engagement is obvious, given the prevalence of multi-year 
energy contracts among MSBs, suggesting that the ‘optimal’ switching level of MSBs likely 
differs from that of householders. Our evidence suggests that there could be benefits from 
increased regulatory oversight of intermediaries’ behaviour. Furthermore we note that existing 
data fail to address an issue of importance for regulatory decision making: the overlap between 
households and MSBs and the potential choice for MSBs between domestic and non-domestic 
contracts. Overall, the paper exemplifies the types of insights that can be obtained by regulators 
providing wider access to the surveys they commission. We recommend that UK regulatory 
agencies share anonymised raw survey data by default to enhance the transparency, and 
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Abstract: While householders’ ability to navigate the domestic retail energy market has generated considerable 
debate, little attention has been given to micro and small businesses’ (MSBs) purchasing of energy. This paper 
provides the first academic assessment of MSBs’ satisfaction with the UK’s retail energy market. Using survey 
data from the UK energy regulator we find that while intermediaries are central to MSBs switching energy 
supplier, the quantity of marketing contact received from them is a key source of dissatisfaction. This 
dissatisfaction with marketing contact has direct policy relevance as the Competition and Market Authority’s 
2016 Energy Market Investigation recommended that a database of ‘disengaged’ MSBs be established to enable 
marketing communications from rival suppliers to prompt MSBs to switch. We also query whether the need for 
more MSB engagement is obvious, given the prevalence of multi-year energy contracts among MSBs, suggesting 
that the ‘optimal’ switching level of MSBs likely differs from that of householders. Our evidence suggests that 
there could be benefits from increased regulatory oversight of intermediaries’ behaviour. Furthermore we note 
that existing data fail to address an issue of importance for regulatory decision making: the overlap between 
households and MSBs and the potential choice for MSBs between domestic and non-domestic contracts. Overall, 
the paper exemplifies the types of insights that can be obtained by regulators providing wider access to the 
surveys they commission. We recommend that UK regulatory agencies share anonymised raw survey data by 
default to enhance the transparency, and potentially quality, of their decision making. 
1. Introduction 
In 2016 the Competition and Market Authority’s (CMA) investigation into the UK energy market 
concluded that there was room for improvement in the energy market for micro and small businesses 
(MSBs).2 The CMA’s conclusions for the MSB energy market were based on analysis of descriptive 
statistics. Using data from Ofgem’s (the UK energy regulator) 2014 and 2015 market monitoring 
surveys, this paper provides the first econometric investigation of MSBs’ satisfaction with the retail 
energy market. By considering only descriptive statistics, rather than performing multivariate analysis, 
policymakers risk basing policy decisions on patterns that are non-robust. 
Policy concern around MSBs and their energy purchases relates to perceived limits on their capacity 
to negotiate commercial energy markets, reflecting that MSBs may exhibit capabilities and behaviours 
which are closer to those of domestic customers than to large corporate undertakings. Over recent 
years, such concerns have led Ofgem to introduce a number of regulatory protections for MSBs which 
                                                          
1 Corresponding author: Dr David Deller, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP), University of East Anglia, 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich, Norfolk, NR4 7TJ, email: david.deller@uea.ac.uk. The support of Research 
Associate Glen Turner is gratefully acknowledged, as are the comments of Kai-Uwe Kuhn and members of 
CCP’s ‘Equity and Justice in Energy Markets’ project team. This paper forms part of the UK Energy Research 
Centre’s (UKERC) research programme. Professor Amelia Fletcher (also at CCP) is a Non-Executive Director on 
the Boards of the UK Financial Conduct Authority, Competition and Markets Authority and Payment Systems 
Regulator, and a decision-maker on enforcement cases at Ofgem. The views expressed here do not necessarily 
reflect the views of any organisation with which she is associated. 
2 See CMA (2016a). While the CMA specifically refers to microbusinesses there is no universally agreed cut-off 
between micro and small businesses. That the boundary is poorly delineated is reflected in Ofgem’s 
microbusiness definition where a microbusiness is defined either by firm size or low consumption i.e. a large 
firm with low energy consumption would be counted as a microbusiness. Ofgem defines a microbusiness as a 
non-domestic customer who: (i) has fewer 10 full time employees or equivalent and an annual turnover (or 
balance sheet) of no more than €2m, or (ii) annual electricity consumption below 100,000kWH, or (iii) annual 
gas consumption below 293,000kWh (see pgA16.1-2, CMA, 2016b).  
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are similar to those in place for residential customers. Nonetheless, price comparisons in the non-
domestic market have been more challenging than in the domestic market. This is due to an absence 
of price comparison websites and energy prices, at least in theory, being the result of individual price 
negotiations. 
This paper reports three main findings. First, the descriptive statistics on engagement and satisfaction 
suggest the energy market for MSBs is performing reasonably well. However, one exception is the 
marketing behaviour of energy brokers and suppliers. Additionally, that over half of MSBs are on multi-
year fixed term energy contracts indicates that assessing MSB engagement in the same way as for 
domestic consumers, i.e. by focussing on the 12-month switching rate, is likely to be problematic.  
Second, ordered logit regressions indicate that an increase in the number of broker approaches 
recalled by MSBs is associated with reduced odds of an MSB reporting a positive overall opinion of 
energy brokers. This result holds even after controlling for whether an MSB used an energy broker as 
the main method to select their current energy supplier. These results are significant as the use of a 
broker in selecting an MSB’s current energy deal is associated with a greater probability of having 
switched in the previous 5 years (see Appendix A for logit regressions detailing this finding). If MSBs 
have a low opinion of brokers, the main route for MSBs to search and switch in the non-domestic 
energy market will appear undesirable for them. 
Third, MSBs with the very lowest energy expenditures have higher odds of reporting greater 
satisfaction with their current supplier’s value for money and overall service compared to MSBs with 
moderate to large energy expenditures. The most straightforward explanation for this result is that 
for MSBs with the lowest energy expenditures the salience of energy is low and so, as long as a basic 
service is always provided, they are unlikely to express significant dissatisfaction with their supplier. 
These results suggest that MSBs with the lowest energy expenditures may have limited motivation to 
engage with the energy market and it is not clear these MSBs will respond to prompts to switch or 
appreciate receiving the prompts.  
These results are directly relevant to the conclusions and policy recommendations of the CMA’s 
market investigation. Mirroring its conclusion for the domestic retail market, the CMA concluded that 
increasing firms’ engagement with the energy market would be beneficial. The CMA proposed a range 
of measures to improve the functioning of the non-domestic energy market; our results speak to two 
in particular: (i) a proposal to establish a database of ‘disengaged’ MSBs’ contact details so that energy 
suppliers can send them marketing materials to encourage them to switch, and (ii) a proposal to 
require increased price transparency for smaller microbusinesses.3 
Our results regarding MSBs’ dislike of energy brokers’ marketing contact suggests they are unlikely to 
welcome the CMA’s database proposal if it involves significant additional marketing contact. When 
implementing this proposal, it seems important for Ofgem to limit the quantity of marketing material 
sent, for example, by using a ‘trusted source’ to send a limited number of communications identifying 
the cheapest deals on the market.  
The dislike of excessive marketing, but the importance of brokers to MSB switching, also supports the 
case for greater regulatory oversight of third party intermediaries (TPIs). The challenge is to limit the 
                                                          
3 Paragraph 17.20, pg 1144-1145, CMA (2016a). Noting the contrast with Ofgem’s microbusiness definition in 
footnote 2, the CMA’s price transparency remedy will only apply to microbusinesses customers meeting all of 
the following criteria: (i) electricity customers in profile classes 1 to 4, with consumption below 50,000kWh per 
annum and on ‘simple’ meters, and (ii) gas customers with ‘small’ supply points and consumption of less than 
73,200kWh per annum. 
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broker contact considered problematic without significantly impeding those communications that 
help MSBs to move to better energy deals. As noted by CMA (2016a), Ofgem does intend to implement 
a Code of Practice regarding non-domestic TPIs. . In addition, the CMA’s price transparency remedy is 
intended to reduce the reliance of MSBs on TPIs when switching supplier. 
Exploration of Ofgem’s survey data raises two broader policy points. First, the sampling procedure 
means the survey only captures firms who are directly responsible for a non-domestic energy contract. 
MSBs where a landlord manages energy purchases are excluded. Moreover, in sampling only MSBs 
using a non-domestic contract, the survey does not capture MSBs who are on domestic supply 
contracts. Overall, it is estimated around half of all MSBs in the UK are excluded from the sampling 
frame (see BMG, 2015 for detail). Not sampling MSBs on domestic supply contracts means Ofgem’s 
survey data cannot investigate how MSBs choose between domestic and non-domestic contracts. 
Second, our analysis highlights the potential benefits from regulators’ allowing academics and other 
parties access to the survey data they collect using public money. External parties can identify insights 
from, and methodological issues with, survey data that a regulator may not have the resources to 
explore itself. Maximising the insights from existing survey data should hopefully ensure high quality 
information is used to take regulatory decisions thereby helping to ensure the best outcomes are 
achieved for consumers. We propose a presumption in favour of sharing the anonymised raw survey 
data commissioned by UK regulators, with a public explanation to be provided where this is not 
possible. UK regulators’ current approach appears inconsistent. The current analysis utilised 
anonymised raw survey data to which we were given special access by Ofgem and, even then, data on 
MSBs’ current supplier was withheld. By contrast, Ofcom (the UK telecoms regulator) makes the 
equivalent raw survey data regarding Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) engagement with 
the telecoms market publicly available on its website, including data on MSBs’ current supplier. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature, before Section 3 describes 
the main econometric method and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports results and Section 
6 delivers policy-relevant conclusions. Appendix A reports results from logit regressions looking at 
factors associated with MSBs having switched in the five years prior to the survey. A range of 
additional appendices provide further detail on the data used and supporting results. 
2. Background and Literature Review 
We believe this paper provides the first econometric assessment of MSBs’ satisfaction and 
engagement with the retail energy market. Focusing on the retail energy market marks a departure 
from earlier academic work investigating MSBs’ energy efficiency investments. 
Since 2012 Ofgem has commissioned annual surveys of non-domestic customers in the British retail 
energy market.4 These reports typically focus on whether satisfaction and engagement vary by firm 
size, and are the result of increased concern following Ofgem’s Retail Market Review around MSBs’ 
ability to navigate the non-domestic energy market. This concern for MSBs is also reflected in the 
CMA’s Energy Market Investigation.5 Significantly, the CMA’s decision making appears reliant on 
analysis of descriptive statistics, primarily from the Ofgem survey reports detailed above. The current 
multivariate analysis therefore marks an advance beyond existing policymaking by assessing whether 
                                                          
4 Carried out by Accent Scotland (2012), The Research Perspective/Element Energy (2014), BMG (2015), BMG 
(2016) and Quadrangle (2017). A qualitative survey (Harris International, 2011) was conducted in 2011. 
5 See Sections 16 and 17 of CMA (2016a), and CMA (2016b). 
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conclusions from the descriptive statistics of individual variables are robust to controlling for a large 
number of variables. 
Beyond Ofgem’s MSB survey evidence, we are aware of survey evidence from the Federation of Small 
Businesses (FSB) (2014) and Cornwall Energy (2013). Compared to the Ofgem data, the FSB survey is 
less representative, being a self-selected sample of FSB members, while the Cornwall Energy survey is 
noticeably smaller in scale. Among other sector regulators, Ofcom has conducted Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprise (SME)6 engagement surveys in 2010, 2014 and 20167, while smaller scale surveys and 
qualitative research on SMEs and financial service products have been commissioned by the CMA and 
FCA.8 
While the policymaking literature focuses on the retail purchasing of energy, the academic literature 
focuses on firms’ energy use and efforts to reduce consumption, primarily through energy efficiency 
investments. Andrews and Johnson (2016) note that, beyond energy efficiency, there has been 
relatively little research into the energy behaviours of business organisations. The current paper 
therefore expands the academic understanding of MSB’s energy behaviours to market engagement. 
Papers looking at energy efficiency investments among SMEs include: Cagno and Trianni (2013), 
Cooremans (2011), Cooremans (2012), Fleiter et al (2012), Trianni and Cagno (2012), Trianni et al 
(2013a), Trianni et al (2013b) and Trianni et al (2016).9 Central to this literature is consideration of the 
barriers to firms investing in energy efficiency projects that on paper offer positive financial returns. 
As this literature considers an investment decision, some of the barriers are less relevant to energy 
market engagement, in particular, access to financing and the methods used to assess projects’ 
financial returns. However, other issues are relevant, in particular, MSBs’ capacity to analyse 
‘technical’ information, the time available to consider energy costs, and the inclination of MSBs’ 
managers to consider energy issues. For example, Coles et al (2016) and Trianni et al (2013a) note 
energy management is generally not a strategic imperative for firms. 
The present paper also speaks to research looking at SMEs’ satisfaction with service providers beyond 
the energy market. Given the primacy of financing to SMEs’ growth/survival, a particular focus has 
been satisfaction with banks. Papers include: Chaston (1993), Binks and Ennew (1997), Madill et al 
(2002), Ibbotson and Moran (2003) and Lundahl et al (2009). Apart from Binks and Ennew and Madill 
et al, these papers use noticeably smaller samples than our analysis. Our research has a different 
emphasis to these papers as it investigates whether satisfaction varies across customer characteristics 
and their interactions with intermediaries rather than by supplier behaviour.  
The banking studies also reflect the relative complexity of banking compared to energy, with 
satisfaction being framed around the banking ‘relationship’ rather than the purchase of a defined 
product. Ennew and Binks (1996), Binks and Ennew (1997), Howarth et al (2003), Lam and Burton 
(2005), Lam and Burton (2006) and Lam et al (2009) go beyond the factors associated with satisfaction 
to consider how satisfaction is associated with SMEs’ switching behaviour. Here the emphasis is on 
helping banks to retain customers rather than addressing broader regulatory questions. Beyond 
banking, Bennett and Robson (2005) and Ramsden and Bennett (2005) consider SMEs’ satisfaction 
                                                          
6 Most of the literature uses the term SMEs rather than MSBs. As with definitions of MSBs, definitions of SMEs 
likely vary between studies. 
7 See Jigsaw (2014) and Jigsaw (2017). Ofcom has also commissioned the following qualitative research: Jigsaw 
(2015) and Analysys Mason (2015). 
8 See Quadrangle (2015), Research Works (2015) and CMA (2015). 




with business advisory services and Suarez et al (2016) consider satisfaction with internet and mobile 
phone services in Spain.  
3. Methodology 
The main econometric analysis involves ordered logit models where the dependent variables are 
different satisfaction metrics. Generalised ordered logit models are also used as a robustness check. 
In Appendix A a logit model for whether or not a firm has switched in the 5 years prior to the survey 
is reported.  
3.1 Ordered Logit Model for Satisfaction Variables 
After dropping Don’t Know/Not Applicable observations, the categories of the satisfaction variables 
have a clear order: Very Satisfied lies above Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied etc.; this means an 
ordered logit model is appropriate. Ordered logit models can be motivated by assuming an underlying 
latent variable, 𝑦∗, running from −∞ to ∞ which can be modelled as: 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖
∗ is the value of the latent variable for firm i, 𝒙𝒊 is the vector of explanatory variables for firm 
i , 𝜷 is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and 𝜀𝑖  is the error term for firm i. Rather than 
observing 𝑦𝑖
∗, we observe 𝑦𝑖  which is divided into J ordinal categories such that: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚    if    𝜏𝑚−1 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝜏𝑚    for    𝑚 = 1 to 𝐽 
where 𝑚 is the category observed, e.g. Satisfied, and the thresholds 𝜏1 to 𝜏𝐽−1 are estimated. 
Supposing 𝑦𝑖  represents satisfaction, the observed categories can be linked to the latent variable in 







1,𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑                                           𝑖𝑓 − ∞ ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝜏1
2,𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑                                     𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝜏2
3,𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑       𝑖𝑓 𝜏2 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝜏3   
4, 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑                                           𝑖𝑓 𝜏3 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝜏4 
5, 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑                                           𝑖𝑓 𝜏4 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < ∞
 
The probability of observing a given category, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚, is the probability that 𝑦𝑖
∗ falls between the 
relevant thresholds: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚|𝒙𝒊) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜏𝑚−1 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝜏𝑚|𝒙𝒊) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜏𝑚−1 ≤ 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + ε < 𝜏𝑚|𝒙𝒊)  
= 𝐹(𝜏𝑚 − 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷) − 𝐹(𝜏𝑚−1 − 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷)                         (1) 
where F is the cumulative density function of 𝜀𝑖, which in the ordered logit model is the logistic 
distribution. Maximum likelihood estimation is used and the regression’s intercept is set to zero so 
each of the thresholds are estimated. 
In ordered logit models the relationship between the signs of the regression coefficients and the 
marginal effects of being in a particular category are only unambiguous for the highest and lowest 
categories. It is easiest to interpret the model by taking the exponent of the coefficients to obtain 
odds ratios.  




𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 > 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑|𝒙𝑖)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑|𝒙𝑖)
 
For an ordered logit model containing k explanatory variables, the exponent of the regression 
coefficient, 𝛽𝑘, shows the multiplicative effect of a unit change in the variable 𝑥𝑘 on the odds Ω. The 
exponent of 𝛽𝑘 is the odds ratio; if greater than one, increasing 𝑥𝑘 increases the odds of a higher 
satisfaction level occurring, while if less than one, increasing 𝑥𝑘 reduces the odds of a higher 
satisfaction level occurring. 
The ordered logit model incorporates the proportional odds assumption.10 This assumption is the main 
difference between ordered logit and multinomial logit models and results in the ordered logit model 
having only one set of coefficients. The proportional odds assumption implies that regardless of the 
categories used to define Ω a unit change in 𝑥𝑘 will have the same impact on Ω. The main analysis thus 
assumes the proportional odds assumption holds. 
To check the results’ robustness to relaxing the proportional odds assumption important regressions 
are re-run using the generalised ordered logit model. Relaxing the proportional odds assumption 
means we allow 𝛽 to vary for each boundary between satisfaction categories such that equation (1) 
becomes: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚|𝒙𝒊) =  𝐹(𝜏𝑚 − 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷𝒎) − 𝐹(𝜏𝑚−1 − 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷𝒎−𝟏) 
Given the relatively small sample size and the large number of categorical variables it is important the 
number of coefficients being estimated is minimised. Hence, we run the generalised ordered logit 
model as a partial proportional odds model. Here the final model run allows 𝛽 to vary for those 
variables where the proportional odds assumption is violated and holds 𝛽 fixed for those variables 
where the proportional odds assumption is not rejected. A stepwise process is used to determine 
which variables are constrained to have proportional odds. Initially no variables are constrained and 
then repeated Wald tests are performed to determine for which variables the proportional odds 
assumption is rejected. Due to the large number of categorical variables in the regressions the Wald 
tests are performed at the 1% significance level; in other words, only if the hypothesis of proportional 
odds is rejected at the 1% level, are the coefficients of a particular variable left unconstrained. 
3.2 Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variables of interest are: (i) annual energy expenditure11, (ii) the recalled 
number of broker approaches received in the last 12 months, and (iii) an MSB’s main method for 
selecting their current energy deal. The control variables are split into two sets: (i) demographic and 
(ii) engagement variables. The full set of demographic control variables are: GB nation, sole or joint 
responsibility for energy, number of employees, sector, whether a franchise or not, turnover, whether 
a home-based business, whether the MSB has a single energy supplier and whether the questionnaire 
referred to gas or electricity. The full set of engagement control variables are: whether the MSB has 
switched in the past five years, recollection of receiving a bill, number of broker approaches, whether 
the MSB reviews energy supply arrangements on receipt of a bill, whether the MSB has a smart meter, 
payment method, main method for choosing current deal, knowledge of contract end date and 
whether the current contract has been read. 
                                                          
10 More generally ordinal regression models involve the parallel regression assumption. 
11 If a respondent failed to report electricity (gas) expenditure in continuous form, they were prompted to 
indicate the category into which their expenditure fell. To create the total energy expenditure variable, where 




We run: (i) univariate regressions, (ii) regressions with demographic controls, and (iii) regressions with 
both demographic and engagement controls. Running regressions without the engagement controls 
shows the associations without the risk of endogeneity issues that may be introduced by some of the 
engagement variables. The univariate regressions in Appendix B show the strength of association 
between important explanatory variables and the dependent variables when all controls are excluded 
and the risk of multi-collinearity is removed.12  
 
4. Data 
This paper utilises survey data from the energy regulator in Great Britain, Ofgem. Access was provided 
to data from 2014 and 2015, with the main analysis using data collected in October and November 
2014. The surveys were designed to be representative of private sector MSBs (defined as businesses 
with 49 employees or fewer) in Great Britain who were responsible for energy purchases and on non-
domestic energy supply contracts. Excluding firms on domestic contracts implies smaller home-based 
businesses with low energy consumption, e.g. consultancies run from home offices or trades people 
working at customer properties, are likely excluded from the sample. Also, firms in premises where a 
landlord manages energy contracts are excluded. Despite these issues, the data is the most 
representative available for assessing MSB’s satisfaction and engagement with the British energy 
market. The survey methodology is described in full in Appendix 3 of BMG (2015) and BMG (2016). All 
references to MSBs refer to the subset of MSBs sampled by Ofgem unless stated otherwise. 
The sampling was designed to achieve a minimum number of interviews for firms operating in 
different sectors and with different numbers of employees; firms possessing 5 or more employees 
were oversampled. While not representative of the full MSB population, the sample design likely 
ensures the MSBs of greatest economic significance are covered. In total 1,502 firms were sampled in 
2014. 
The regression analysis uses an unweighted dataset, but the oversampling of larger MSBs means 
descriptive statistics representative of MSBs on non-domestic supply contracts requires the 
application of weights. Even after applying weights it is likely the survey was completed by relatively 
engaged firms; BMG (2015) reports 40% of contacted firms refused to take part, a refusal rate they 
considered high.  
A complication of the survey design is that, after questions on business characteristics, most of the 
questionnaire referred to only one fuel, either electricity or gas.13 Since 53.7% of respondent firms 
only consumed electricity, in the regression analysis we only consider data for firms providing answers 
applicable to their electricity supplier. The analysed data in 2014 therefore comprises three types of 
MSBs: (i) those only consuming electricity, (ii) those purchasing both electricity and gas from the same 
supplier, and (iii) those purchasing electricity and gas from separate suppliers where the questionnaire 
referenced electricity. We include dummy variables in the regressions indicating when firms had a 
single energy supplier and when the questionnaire referenced gas.  
The regressions in the main text consider four dependent variables: 
                                                          
12 Appendix C reports the small number of cases where the proportional odds assumption is violated in the 
univariate regressions in Appendix B. 




1. Overall view of energy brokers 
2. Satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices in the energy market 
3. Satisfaction with current supplier’s value for money 
4. Satisfaction with current supplier’s overall service 
Each of the variables are five-point lickert scales. For variable 1 the scale runs from Very Negative to 
Very Positive, while for variables 2 to 4 the scale runs from Very Dissatisfied to Very Satisfied. To ensure 
a consistent dataset across the regressions we drop firms answering Don’t Know/Not Applicable to 
any of the dependent variables.14 To ensure valid responses we also drop observations where the 
respondent did not have responsibility for all fuels at all sites and where firms were recorded as 
without a gas connection but which were nevertheless recorded as answering questions referencing 
gas. The final analysed sample comprises 1,083 firms. 
Appendix E illustrates the key differences between the firms analysed in the regressions and the 
estimated characteristics of the population targeted by the survey. Beyond the skew to larger firms 
reflected in their number of employees, turnover and energy expenditures, Figure E3 shows 
differences between the sectors of analysed firms and the target population with. Most notably, 
15.5% of firms in the analysed sample are from the Retail/Wholesale sector compared to a population 
estimate of 28.0%. 
Turning to the dependent variables (see Appendix F), the distribution of responses to the satisfaction 
indicators is broadly similar when comparing the analysed sample and population estimates. The main 
difference is the deliberate removal of Don’t Know/Not Applicable responses from the analysed 
sample. This has a larger impact for the market indicators than for the current supplier indicators; the 
population estimate for the proportion of firms not rating their current supplier’s value for money is 
2.7% compared to 7.4% for the competitive of prices in the market. Potentially related to the removal 
of uncertain responses, Table E2 shows analysed firms are more engaged than the population 
estimates. For example, 65.7% of analysed firms report switching in the previous 5 years compared to 
a population estimate of 59.8%.  
We focus on the 2014 survey data as it is more amenable to analysis than the data from 2015. First, 
the 2014 dataset reports whether the interviewer referenced electricity or gas in the questionnaire. 
Second, in 2014, number of employees, turnover, electricity expenditure, gas expenditure and number 
of broker approaches are recorded as continuous as well as categorical variables. Nevertheless, the 
2015 data is used as a robustness check for the main 2014 results.  
A condition of our data access was that the identity of respondent firms’ energy supplier(s) were not 
provided. As a result, the regressions do not control for individual suppliers’ idiosyncratic 
characteristics. 
5. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we set the scene with some descriptive statistics before turning to our main regression 
results. Our regressions focus on the associations of (i) the quantity of broker contact and (ii) energy 
expenditure with MSBs’ satisfaction with brokers and suppliers.  
 
                                                          
14 Firms failing to answer whether they had switched in the last 5 years are also dropped. 
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5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics below provide an overview of the MSB energy market and contextualise the 
CMA’s remedy proposals. The reported descriptive statistics are weighted population estimates, 
unless stated otherwise. Appendix E provides descriptive statistics covering the characteristics of the 
analysed MSBs. The descriptive statistics in the main text cover three areas: (i) the switching rate, (ii) 
satisfaction with current supplier, and (iii) satisfaction with the market. The message from (i) and (ii) 
appears broadly positive. Once the length of contracts is accounted for, the annualised switching rate 
appears high (compared to the residential market) and the percentage of respondents satisfied with 
their current energy supplier noticeably outnumbers the percentage who are dissatisfied. If the 
majority of consumers are satisfied with their supplier and switch reasonably frequently, it is not 
immediately obvious that the MSB market is ‘failing’ and requires significant intervention. However, 
especially with the switching rate, this positive impression may be affected by the sampling 
methodology.  
Satisfaction with ‘the market’ is more neutral and there is a significant dissatisfaction with the sales 
approaches of energy suppliers and brokers. However, more MSBs report satisfaction with the ease 
of switching supplier than report dissatisfaction.  
5.1.1 The Switching Rate 
Debate about the residential energy market often focuses on the rate of switching between suppliers, 
generally assessed over a 12-month period. In contrast to the residential market, where almost all 
fixed-term contracts cover 12 months, when considering MSBs’ switching rate it is necessary to 
account for multi-year fixed-term contracts. 53.9%15 of MSBs are estimated to have a fixed-term 
contract lasting 2 years or more. Also, while residential contracts can be broken by paying a relatively 
small penalty fee, non-domestic contracts can only be broken by paying the contract’s full value.16 Due 
to the prevalence of multi-year fixed term contracts the dependent variable in Appendix A is whether 
firms switched at least once in the 5 years prior to the survey.17  
In 2014 the estimated percentage of firms switching at least once in the previous 5 years was 59.8% 
(65.7% in the analysed sample),  while the estimated 12-month switching rate was 23.4% (26.3% in 
the analysed sample). This is almost double the estimated 12-month residential switching rate of 13% 
for electricity and gas in 2014.18 Accounting for multi-year contracts gives a 12-month MSB switching 
rate that is higher still.  
An approximate adjustment to the 12-month switching rate, to account for multi-year contracts, can 
be made by considering the proportion of firms free to switch in a given year. For example, for firms 
with two-year contracts a reasonable starting assumption is that 50% can switch in any 12-month 
period, while for firms with three year contracts one might expect 33.3% can switch in a given year. 
                                                          
15 Those with evergreen contracts or who were unsure about the nature of their contract are included in the 
denominator (not the numerator) for this percentage. 
16 Paragraph 29(a)(i), pg A16.1-13, CMA (2016b) 
17 However, considering the five year switching rate introduces other issues, in particular, that some small 
firms will not have been in operation for five years. 
18 See pg10, Ipsos MORI (2014), a survey for Ofgem. BEIS’s aggregate switching data indicates a slightly lower 
residential switching rate of 10.9% for electricity and 10.3% for gas in 2014 ( Table 2.7.1 ‘Transfer statistics in 
the domestic gas and electricity markets in Great Britain (annual)’, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/quarterly-domestic-energy-switching-statistics). The 
slightly higher survey switching rate likely reflects survey response bias: more ‘engaged’ consumers are more 
likely to participate in surveys. 
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Multiplying the percentage of firms with a given contract length by the likely fraction of firms who can 
switch per year and then summing across the different contract lengths gives the total percentage of 
firms able to switch in a 12-month period. This method indicates 68% of firms were likely to have been 
able to switch in the 12 months prior to the 2014 survey.19 Using 68% as the base for the switching 
rate gives a 12-month switching rate of 34.3% (39.5% in the analysed sample). 
While these switching rates present a positive story about MSBs’ engagement, the conclusions need 
to be tempered by recognising how survey design and response may influence the results. First, BMG 
(2015)20 note the survey refusal rate was considered high at 40%. In particular, BMG report that many 
refusals resulted from ‘a lack of time’ and also some difficulties were encountered convincing potential 
participants that the survey was genuine and not a disguised sales call. A conservative starting 
assumption would be that survey respondents are more engaged than the underlying population of 
MSBs. 
 Second, we note that there is a significant increase in the switching rate between the 2013 and 2014 
Ofgem surveys21, and that the sampling methodology also changed between these two years. In 2013 
the recorded switching rates were noticeably lower: the 12-month switching rate was no more than 
18%, while the five year switching rate was no higher than 40%.22  That the five-year switching rate is 
around 20 percentage points lower in 2013 than 2014 is striking. In 2013 the sampling method did not 
explicitly exclude firms on domestic contracts or where the landlord held the energy supply contract, 
instead it simply required that firms did not operate exclusively from a residential address.23 
Third, the 2014 switching rate is substantially above that obtained from aggregate switching statistics. 
Using aggregate switching data, Ofgem (2015) reports the annual switching rate between July 2014 
and June 2015 was 13% for non-half-hourly metered electricity, 15% for half-hourly metered 









                                                          
19 To be conservative these figures assume all firms without a fixed-term contract or who did not know their 
contract type/length can freely switch at any time. Also, firms who could not recall their switching behaviour 
are assumed not to have switched. 
20 See pg81. 
21 BMG (2014) cautions that the 2013 and 2014 results are not comparable, i.e. differences in the results may 
be influenced by the surveys’ designs. 
22 Table 17, pg42, The Research Perspective/Element Energy (2013). 
23 pg11, The Research Perspective/Element Energy (2013). 
24 para 3.55, pg 34, Ofgem (2015). Since this aggregate data is based on firms of all sizes (not only MSBs), in 
theory, the difference to the survey figures might be possible to reconcile. However, we are not aware of any 




5.1.2 Satisfaction with current supplier 
 
Figure 1: MSBs’ satisfaction with their current energy supplier25  
Figure 1 shows the consistently positive view of respondents regarding their current energy supplier. 
The percentage of respondents Quite Satisfied or Very Satisfied with their current supplier is between 
2.4 times (for information on tariffs/options) and 6.9 times (for meeting business’ needs) the 
percentage who are Quite Dissatisfied or Very Dissatisfied.  
5.1.3 Satisfaction with the market 
While firms appear satisfied with their current suppliers, their view of the market is less positive, and 
varies noticeably between indicators. Where the market is considered in general terms, the responses 
are broadly neutral, as shown in Figure 2.  
However, when suppliers and brokers are referenced the views becomenegatively skewed, as shown 
in Figure 3. This negativity is particularly strong for brokers with 31.5% of MSBs being Very Dissatisfied 
with brokers’ sales approach and 27.1% of MSBs having a Very Negative overall view of brokers. The 
percentage of firms who report being Quite Dissatisfied or Very Dissatisfied with brokers’ sales 
approach is 2.6 times the percentage who report being Quite Satisfied or Very Satisfied, while the 
percentage with a Quite Negative or Very Negative overall opinion of brokers is 2.2 times those 
holding a Quite Positive or Very Positive opinion. 
                                                          
25 N/A refers to responses of Don’t Know and Refused. In all figures in this paper, the ‘whiskers’ represent the 




Figure 2: Aspects of the market where MSBs’ views are broadly neutral 
 
Figure 3: Aspects of the market where MSBs’ views are negatively skewed26 
Figure 4 shows there is also one aspect of the market where MSBs’ views are positively skewed: the 
ease of switching supplier. The percentage of MSBs’ reporting being Quite Satisfied or Very Satisfied 
with the ease of switching supplier is 1.9 times the percentage reporting Quite Dissatisfied or Very 
Dissatisfied. While there may be room for improvement, this result does not provide obvious support 
for a general policy need to make switching easier or policy interventions that carry downside risks. 
                                                          
26 In the survey questionnaire the scale for the Overall View of Brokers ran from Very negative to Very positive 
and N/A was Don’t Know.  
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However, the high percentage of MSBs not rating the ease of switching (14.1%) relates to firms that 
have not switched in the recent past27, these inactive MSBs may benefit from an engagement remedy.  
 
Figure 4: MSBs’ view of the ease of switching supplier 
It is also possible to test formally whether MSBs have systematically more positive or negative views 
of particular issues by applying a matched pairs sign test28. Focusing on the analysed sample and the 
dependent variables used in the regressions, one can state that MSBs’ satisfaction with their current 
supplier’s value for money and overall service is higher than with all the market characteristics in 
Figure 2 at the 1% level. MSBs’ overall opinion of brokers is lower than their satisfaction with the 
market characteristics in Figure 2 at the 1% level, while MSBs’ satisfaction with the ease of switching 
is higher than their satisfaction with Figure 2’s market characteristics. 
5.1.4 Detail on MSBs’ View of Brokers 
The logit regressions in Appendix A (see Table A1) indicate a strong association between an MSB 
having used a broker to select their current energy supply deal and having switched in the five years 
prior to interview. Among those MSBs who had switched in the five years prior to interview, the most 
common method of choosing their current deal was by using a broker; 36.7% of those who had 
switched used a broker.29 Equally, the regressions suggest that receiving a large number of approaches 
from brokers is not associated with an increased probability of having switched. Here we present 
further descriptive statistics regarding MSBs’ opinion of brokers. The policy challenge is to minimise 
brokers’ marketing contact, which MSBs dislike, while still ensuring that MSBs access brokers that 
provide a useful service.  
                                                          
27 80.6% of those responding N/A are estimated to have not switched in the five years prior to the survey, even 
among those who were Very Dissatisfied with the ease of switching the rate of not having switched was only 
39.4%.  
28 Here a numerical value is used for each category, in this instance from 1 for Very Dissatisfied running to 5 for 
Very Satisfied. The matched pairs sign test tests whether the median value of the difference between two of 
the indicators is zero. 




25.8% of MSBs used a broker as their main method to choose their current supplier/tariff, while 
another 29.9% of firms had contacted or been approached by a broker but used an alternative method 
to select their current supplier/tariff. Significantly, but unsurprisingly, Figure 5 shows firms’ opinion of 
brokers varies with the nature of their contact with brokers.  
 
Figure 5: Overall view of brokers by MSBs’ use of brokers when selecting current supplier/tariff 
First, firms who used a broker as their main choice method tend to have a positive view of brokers. 
This could reflect the fact that brokers, when used to perform a search of the market, provide a good 
service. Certainly, it suggests that removing brokers from the market entirely would not be justified: 
for a subset of firms they appear to provide a valued service.  However, the 30% of firms who had 
contact with a broker30, but did not use a broker as their main choice method, had the lowest opinion 
of brokers: 38.3% have a Very Negative view of brokers. This result is due to those MSBs who had a 
negative experience of brokers when contacted by them, being particularly unlikely to use them for 
their main choice method. However, it is not entirely clear whether this ‘negative experience’ is simply 
receiving unwelcome marketing contact or something more fundamental with the service of provided 
by brokers. 
Figure 6 shows that the number of broker approaches appears strongly associated with negative views 
of brokers. While 15.7% of MSBs recalling 1 to 5 broker approaches reported a Very Negative view of 
brokers, this figure rises to 32.9% for MSBs receiving 11 to 20 approaches and 52.7% for firms receiving 
over 50 approaches/too many approaches to remember. However, one might question how 
accurately respondents can recall the precise number of approaches received, especially when the 
stated number is large. Also, reporting a large number of approaches may reflect a particular dislike 
of broker contact. 
                                                          
30 We do not know the proportion of firms that initiated contact with the broker they used to select their 




Figure 6: Percentage of MSBs with a Very Negative view of brokers by the number of broker approaches 
they recall receiving in the 12 months prior to interview 
5.2 Regression Results – The impact of broker contact 
In this section, we report the results of regressions which seek to show the association between the 
quantity of broker approaches and (i) MSBs’ overall view of brokers and (ii) their satisfaction with the 
ease of comparing prices in the market, after controlling for a wide range of factors.  
We note that for all the regressions a common theme is that firm characteristics, e.g. turnover and 
sector, have limited associations with the satisfaction variables. While this suggests limited variation 
in satisfaction across firms with different characteristics, this finding should not be overplayed given 
the survey’s relatively small sample size. 
5.2.1 Broker contact and MSBs’ opinion of brokers 
Table 1 reports the odds ratios for respondents reporting a more positive view of energy brokers. The 
main finding, confirming the finding from the descriptive statistics in section 5.1.4, is that recalling a 
greater number of broker approaches is strongly associated with reduced odds of having a more 
positive view of energy brokers.31 When the number of broker approaches is treated as a categorical 
variable, reporting the receipt of 6-10 broker contacts compared to 1-5 broker approaches is 
associated with the odds of having a more positive view of energy brokers falling by more than 40%. 
Indeed, reporting over 50 contacts or that there were too many contacts to remember, implies the 
odds of having a more positive view of brokers is at least five times lower than for someone reporting 
1-5 broker contacts. When the number of broker approaches is treated as a continuous variable 
(columns 5, 9 and 11), each additional broker approach is associated with a 1.2 percent drop in the 
odds of having a more positive view of brokers. These associations regarding broker approaches are 
consistently significant at the 1% level.  
Significantly, the results in columns 6-11 of Table 1 occur after controlling for the main choice method 
used by respondents to select their current deal. In other words, even if a firm used a broker as their 
                                                          
31 This finding mirrors the univariate regressions in Table B6 in Annex B. 
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main method to select their current deal, reporting a higher number of broker approaches is 
associated with a lower overall view of brokers. The regression results also confirm that MSBs who 
used a method other than a broker to select their current energy deal have reduced odds of having a 
positive view of brokers.  
 
Table 1: Odds ratios for reporting a more positive overall view of energy brokers 
Across all the regressions in Table 1, having more employees is associated with increased odds of 
reporting a more positive view of brokers. Each additional employee is associated with around a two 
percent increase in the odds of reporting a more positive view of brokers. That MSBs with more 
employees are more likely to have a more positive view of brokers may suggest the benefits of brokers 
are more obvious, or easier to access, for more ‘sophisticated’ firms. A possible explanation is that 
MSBs with more employees are more likely to have an individual with dedicated responsibility for 
procurement who may be more comfortable with the process of comparing prices and interacting 
with brokers. 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)# (11)#
Number of employees 1.023*** 1.018** 1.018** 1.022*** 1.020** 1.013* 1.018** 1.019** 1.017** 1.021*** 1.017**
Energy Expenditure: £500 or less 1.133
Energy Expenditure: £501-1,000 1.042
Energy Expenditure: £1-2.5k -
Energy Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.862
Energy Expenditure: £5-10k 1.051
Energy Expenditure: £10-15k 0.796
Energy Expenditure: £15-25k 0.856
Energy Expenditure: £25-50k 2.043**
Energy Expenditure: £50k+ 1.545
Energy Expenditure: Don't 
Know/Refused
1.073
Continuous: Log Energy Expenditure 1.036 1.024 1.031 1.009 1.004 1.003 0.987 0.951 0.988 0.939
Not switched in last 5 years - - - - - -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 1.312** 0.912 0.865 0.816 0.880 0.836
No. Broker Approaches: None 0.912 1.163 1.284 1.164
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 0.566*** 0.573*** 0.563*** 0.540***
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.298*** 0.343*** 0.346*** 0.341***
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.227*** 0.275*** 0.273*** 0.277***
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 0.095*** 0.118*** 0.102*** 0.116***
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too 
many to remember
0.174*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.198***
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 0.509** 0.697 0.755 0.707
Continuous: No. Broker Approaches 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.988***
Main choice method: Broker - - - - - -
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service
0.274*** 0.298*** 0.296*** 0.271*** 0.305*** 0.285***
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
0.151*** 0.162*** 0.154*** 0.134*** 0.166*** 0.151***
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
0.175*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.141*** 0.172*** 0.158***
Main choice method: Other 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.086*** 0.079***
Main choice method: Don't know 0.516 0.484 0.541 0.378* 0.638 0.498
Log likelihood -1603.19 -1506.68 -1504.23 -1440.11 -1394.64 -1415.81 -1356.27 -1350.55 -1297.89 -1358.4 -1313.94
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.018 0.074 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Yes#
Engagement Controls No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes# Yes#
N 1083 1011 1011 1011 961 1011 1011 1011 961 1011 961
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold
indicates the base category for categorical variables. # indicates only those control variables that showed some statistical significance in column 9 are
retained (specifically only knowledge of contract end date was retained). Columns 1-9 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the odds
are defined as the probability of having a more positive view of brokers relative to the probability of having a less positive view. Column 10 and 11 report
odds ratios from a generalised ordered logit model where a partial parallel odds assumption is allowed and the reported odds ratios relate to whether
MSBs hold a Very Negative view of brokers versus a more positive view. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are reported, the variable
was not included in the relevant column's regression. In columns 2 to 11 where a continuous log energy expenditure variable is used 71 observations are
dropped as responses of Don't Know/Refused can no longer be used and one observation is dropped for having a value of zero. When treating energy
expenditure as continuous 224 observations involved taking the mid-point of a category. Similarly in columns 2, 9 and 11 50 observations were dropped as
the continuous number of broker approaches variable cannot include the responses of Don't Know/Refused. Variables frequently significant across
regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported are (direction of association reported in brackets): does not know when contract ends (negative,
columns 8-10) and does not have a fixed term contract (negative, columns 8-10).
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In column 11 where the generalised ordered logit model is used and broker approaches are treated 
as continuous, for no variables was the parallel odds assumption violated; in other words, the ordered 
logit model is valid. In column 10 where the number of broker approaches was treated as a categorical 
variable, the proportional odds assumption was only violated by a single category of the number of 
broker approaches variable. For this one category the odds ratios vary by the opinion level used to 
define the odds. In particular, when considering whether MSBs hold a Very Positive view relative to 
less positive views, reporting not receiving any broker approaches was associated with a 91.6% 
increase in the odds of having a Very Positive view compared to reporting 1-5 broker approaches 
(significant at the 5% level). 
Table D1 confirms the strong negative association between the number of broker approaches recalled 
and MSBs’ overall view of energy brokers also holds for the 2015 data. 
5.2.2 Contact and the ease of comparing prices 
As the CMA noted, price transparency has historically been limited in the non-domestic energy 
market. This means that brokers play an important role in MSBs’ searches for good energy deals. A 
possible fear may be that the negative impact of brokers’ marketing behaviour not only affects MSBs’ 
view of brokers but also their satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices (searching) in the energy 
market more generally. Table 2 provides some evidence that a greater number of broker approaches 
is associated with reduced satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices, although, this is weaker 
than in Table 1. When the number of broker approaches is treated as a continuous, one additional 
broker approach is associated with a 0.2 percent reduction in the odds of reporting higher satisfaction 
with the ease of comparing prices (columns 5, 9 and 11). However, not only is this effect’s magnitude 
rather small, it is also only significant at the 10% level. 
Considering the number of broker approaches as a categorical variable shows the association with 
satisfaction regarding the ease of comparing prices is uneven.32 Compared to reporting 1-5 broker 
approaches reporting no broker approaches is associated with around a 60 percent increase in the 
odds of reporting higher satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices (columns 4, 7, 8 and 10). This 
may reflect that many MSBs only choose to use a broker if they feel a broker offers an easier/better 
route to identify good deals in the market, i.e. searching the market unassisted is a relatively difficult 
task.  
Also, reporting 21-30 broker approaches or 50+/too many to remember are associated with a 35-50 
percent drop in the odds of reporting higher satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices compared 
to reporting 1-5 approaches. However, the odds ratios for other numbers of broker approaches are 
generally statistically insignificant at the 10% level.  
In Table 2 there is no evidence that using a broker to select one’s current energy deal increases 
satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices, apart from relative to the unspecified method of 
‘other’. Also, unlike in Table 1, there is no association between the number of employees and the odds 
of reporting greater satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices. This lack of relationship may be 
influenced by the fact that larger MSBs are performing more extensive/complex searches that are 
harder to complete. 
Last, the generalised ordered logit regressions in columns 10 and 11 did not identify any violations of 
the proportional odds assumption and so the ordered logit model is appropriate. 
                                                          
32 The limited significance of the number of broker approaches variable mirrors the univariate regression 




Table 2: Odds ratios for reporting greater satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices in the 
market 
5.3 Regression Results – The Salience of Energy 
Here we consider factors associated with MSBs’ satisfaction with their current energy supplier. In 
particular, we note that MSBs with the very lowest energy expenditures seem are associated with 
higher satisfaction than other MSBs, after controlling for other factors. A potential explanation is that 
for firms with the lowest energy expenditures the salience of energy, and its cost, is low so that simply 
ensuring that ‘the lights stay on’ is sufficient for an MSB to be reasonably satisfied with their energy 
supplier. Another, far more complex, explanation regarding differing rates of VAT on energy is 
discussed in Appendix G. 
That MSBs with low energy expenditures have higher satisfaction levels is potentially significant for 
the questions of whether the engagement of MSBs can or should be increased. Higher satisfaction 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)# (11)#
Number of employees 1.012 1.009 1.009 1.012 1.008 1.008 1.011 1.011 1.006 1.010 1.007
Energy Expenditure: £500 or less 1.026
Energy Expenditure: £501-1,000 0.897
Energy Expenditure: £1-2.5k -
Energy Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.823
Energy Expenditure: £5-10k 0.645**
Energy Expenditure: £10-15k 0.768
Energy Expenditure: £15-25k 0.504**
Energy Expenditure: £25-50k 0.700
Energy Expenditure: £50k+ 1.056
Energy Expenditure: Don't 
Know/Refused
0.623*
Continuous: Log Energy Expenditure 0.919 0.920 0.914 0.923 0.917 0.914 0.897* 0.904* 0.911* 0.909*
Not switched in last 5 years - - - - - -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 0.998 0.955 0.894 0.902 0.923 0.917
No. Broker Approaches: None 1.549** 1.610** 1.639** 1.578**
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 0.730* 0.740 0.700* 0.724*
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.866 0.879 0.851 0.825
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.504** 0.534** 0.498** 0.510**
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 1.483 1.541 1.594 1.609
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too 
many to remember
0.609*** 0.637*** 0.599*** 0.636***
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 1.036 1.095 1.120 1.065
Continuous: No. Broker Approaches 0.998* 0.998* 0.998*
Main choice method: Broker - - - - - -
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service
1.043 1.059 1.065 1.067 1.091 1.078
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
0.789 0.807 0.789 0.794 0.839 0.852
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
0.799 0.765 0.780 0.787 0.787 0.800
Main choice method: Other 0.424** 0.448** 0.404** 0.408** 0.417** 0.411**
Main choice method: Don't know 0.792 0.815 0.794 0.620 1.062 0.822
Log likelihood -1676.40 -1571.01 -1571.01 -1556.73 -1490.45 -1566.50 -1552.48 -1542.21 -1479.92 -1556.30 -1493.53
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.101 0.106 0.132 0.001 0.045 0.058 0.001 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.011
Firm Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes# Yes#
Engagement Controls No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes# Yes#
N 1083 1011 1011 1011 961 1011 1011 1011 961 1011 961
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold indicates the base
category for categorical variables. # indicates only those control variables that showed some statistical significance in column 9 are retained (specifically country,
sector, whether has a smart meter and whether read their contract were retained). Columns 1-9 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the odds are
defined as the probability of being more satisfied with the ease of comparing prices in the market relative to the probability of being less satisfied. Column 10 and 11
report odds ratios from a generalised ordered logit model where a partial parallel odds assumption is allowed and the reported odds ratios relate to whether MSBs are
Very Dissatisfied with the ease of comparing prices or are more satisfied. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are reported, the variable was not
included in the relevant column's regression. In columns 2 to 11 where a continuous log energy expenditure variable is used 71 observations are dropped as responses
of Don't Know/Refused can no longer be used and one observation is dropped for having a value of zero. When treating energy expenditure as continuous 224
observations involved taking the mid-point of a category. Similarly in columns 2, 9 and 11 50 observations were dropped as the continuous number of broker approaches
variable cannot include the responses of Don't Know/Refused. Variables frequently significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported are (direction




with their current supplier will likely reduce the motivation of an MSB to switch supplier as the benefit 
from switching will appear lower. This reduced motivation to switch for MSBs with low energy 
expenditures may explain why in Table B4 and some regressions in Table A1 higher energy 
expenditures are associated with a greater probability of having switched in the 5 years prior to the 
survey. Even if the higher satisfaction of MSBs with low energy expenditures is due to energy having 
limited salience among firms, it is not automatic that prompts to engage will be beneficial for MSBs. 
Those running all MSBs have a time allocation problem: they need to allocate the limited time 
available to maximise profits/utility33. The lower are energy expenditures, the more likely it is that in 
the time taken to switch supplier an alternative activity is available that delivers a greater return in 
terms of profits/utility. In other words, the lower are energy expenditures, the more likely it is that an 
MSB rationally chooses not to engage with the energy market. However, steps to reduce the amount 
of time required to search/switch are still potentially beneficial as they potentially increase the return 
from allocating a given amount of time to search/switching. 
5.3.1 Satisfaction with current supplier’s value for money 
Table 3 shows energy expenditure’s statistically significant association with MSBs’ satisfaction with 
their current energy supplier’s value for money. Reporting expenditure of £5,000-10,000 per annum 
compared to expenditure of £1,000-2,500 is associated with the odds of greater satisfaction with 
suppliers’ value for money being reduced by over 40% (see columns 1 and 6). However, rather than a 
stable decline in satisfaction as energy expenditures increase, it appears that above the expenditure 
category of £1,000-2,500 there is a steep drop to a lower, but relatively stable, level of satisfaction 
with suppliers’ value for money. This non-linearity is reflected in the relationship between log energy 
expenditure and value for money satisfaction being significant at the 1% level in Table 3. The odds 
ratio for log energy expenditure indicates that each 1% increase in energy expenditure is associated 
with around a 20% drop in the odds of an MSB reporting a higher level of value for money satisfaction. 
In columns 9 and 10, where generalised ordered logit regressions are reported, the odds ratio relate 
to the odds comparing the probability of being Very Satisfied relative to the probability of being in a 
lower satisfaction category. Challenges were encountered running the generalised ordered logit 
model for this dependent variable and so the only control variables were dummy variables 
representing the specific categories of the control variables in column 6 that were found to be 
significant. Nevertheless, Column 10 shows the relationship between log energy expenditure and 
value for money satisfaction is robust to the relaxation of the parallel odds assumption. Column 9 
indicates that when energy expenditure is a categorical variable, there is a noticeable loss of 
significance compared to equivalent regressions in the ordered logit model (columns 1 and 6).34 
However, treating energy expenditure as continuous is preferred as it maximises the information 
contained in the data.  
The 2015 data in Table D3 also show that the MSBs with the very lowest electricity expenditures, i.e. 
those with expenditures below £500, have greater odds of higher satisfaction than MSBs with 
electricity expenditures in the range £2,500-25,000. However, if the base expenditure category is set 
as electricity expenditures of £1,000-2,500 the statistical significance of the odds ratios for higher 
electricity expenditure categories largely disappears in 2015.  
                                                          
33 Some MSBs may be run in a manner other than to strictly maximise profits. 
34 The proportional odds assumption does not hold for the expenditure category £5,000-10,000. The odds ratio 
is less than one and statistically significant at the 5% level when defined with reference to: (i) the Neither 
Satisfied nor Dissatisfied/Quite Satisfied boundary and (ii) the Quite Dissatisfied/Neither  
Satisfied nor Dissatisfied boundary. 
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If one considers the salience of energy costs as potentially influencing firms’ satisfaction with their 
energy supplier, one question is whether energy costs in absolute terms, or relative to turnover/total 
costs, is the more appropriate way to assess salience. To investigate this, univariate regressions35 were 
run considering energy expenditures as a percentage of turnover.36 When the log of this fraction is 
placed in a univariate regression, it has an association with value for money satisfaction significant at 
the 1% level. A one percent increase in the value of energy expenditure as a fraction of turnover is 
associated with a 14 percent reduction in the odds of reporting higher value for money satisfaction. 
When log turnover and log energy expenditure are included as separate variables in a single 
regression, log energy expenditure has an association with value for money satisfaction significant at 
the 1% level, while log turnover is only significant at the 5% level. In summary, it is not clear whether 
the salience of energy expenditure is best assessed in absolute or percentage terms, however, both 
treatments show a negative association with value for money satisfaction when the appropriate 
functional form is adopted.37 
 
 
                                                          
35 For brevity we do not report the full results of these regressions, although, they are available from the 
authors on request. 
36 This reduces the sample size to 775 due to the large number of firms reporting Don’t Know or Refused to the 
turnover question. 
37 The survey also included two categorical questions asking the percentage of a firm’s costs accounted for by 
electricity/gas. Both when looking solely at electricity, and when combining the response to look at energy as a 
percentage of a firm’s costs, in univariate regressions a degree of support is found for firms devoting a higher 
proportion of costs to electricity/energy having lower odds of reporting greater value for money satisfaction. 
However, in each case only one percentage cost category is found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Compared to MSBs where electricity accounts for less than 10% of costs, reporting that electricity forms 20-




Table 3: Odds ratios for reporting greater satisfaction with current energy supplier’s value for 
money 
5.3.2 Satisfaction with current supplier’s overall service 
As with value for money satisfaction, in Table 4 there is a consistently significant negative, but non-
linear, association between energy expenditure and satisfaction with a current supplier’s overall 
service. When energy expenditure is treated as a categorical variable, firms reporting moderately high 
energy expenditure have lower odds of reporting higher satisfaction. That the odds ratios for the 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)# (10)#
Energy Expenditure: £500 or less 1.441 1.531 1.442
Energy Expenditure: £501-1,000 1.067 1.083 1.048
Energy Expenditure: £1-2.5k - - -
Energy Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.615*** 0.617*** 0.635***
Energy Expenditure: £5-10k 0.566*** 0.546*** 0.813
Energy Expenditure: £10-15k 0.505*** 0.468*** 0.560**
Energy Expenditure: £15-25k 0.568** 0.558** 0.724
Energy Expenditure: £25-50k 0.497** 0.477** 0.578*
Energy Expenditure: £50k+ 0.700 0.616 0.78
Energy Expenditure: Don't 
Know/Refused
0.704 0.619* 0.706
Continuous: Energy Expenditure 
(£500 units)
0.996 0.995
Continuous: Energy Expenditure 
Squared (£500 units)
1.000 1.000
Continuous: Log Energy Expenditure 0.808*** 0.811*** 0.812*** 0.796*** 0.855***
Not switched in last 5 years - - - - - - -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 0.909 0.956 0.913 0.893 0.894 0.908 0.909
No. Broker Approaches: None 1.073 0.966 1.097 1.079 1.367 1.551*
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - - - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 1.034 1.020 1.025 1.001 1.080 1.066
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.841 0.829 0.780 0.800 0.880 0.866
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.844 0.817 0.850 0.827 1.470 1.721
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 1.157 1.489 1.172 1.225 1.717 1.371
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too 
many to remember
0.747* 0.764 0.736* 0.736* 0.816 0.782
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 0.820 0.873 0.824 0.824 0.855 0.834
Main choice method: Broker - - - - - -
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service
1.255 1.260 1.340 1.266 1.302 1.272
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
1.248 1.218 1.255 1.251 1.203 1.209
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
1.221 1.241 1.338* 1.279 1.203 1.207
Main choice method: Other 0.563 0.609 0.581 0.565 1.030 0.581
Main choice method: Don't know 0.875 1.017 1.070 0.963 0.948 0.889
Log likelihood -1593.67 -1497.09 -1490.7 -1490.4 -1484.61 -1574.57 -1480.77 -1474.29 -1549.69 -1456.96
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.002 0.033 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.027 0.003 0.000 0.000
Firm Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes# Yes#
Engagement Controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes# Yes#
N 1082 1011 1010 1010 1010 1082 1011 1010 1082 1010
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold
indicates the base category for categorical variables. # indicates only the categories in the control variables that showed some statistical significance in
column 6 are retained (specifically country, sector, turnover, business operated from a home, whether has a smart meter, payment method and whether read
their contract were retained). Columns 1-8 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the odds are defined as the probability of an MSB being
more satisfied with their current supplier's value for money relative to the probability of being less satisfied. Columns 9 and 10 report odds ratios from a
generalised ordered logit model where a partial parallel odds assumption is allowed and the reported odds ratios relate to whether MSBs are Very Satisfied
with their current supplier's value for money or are less satisfied. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are reported, the variable was not
included in the relevant column's regression. In all columns one observation is dropped for being perfectly determined. In columns 2-5, 7, 8 and 10 where a
continuous energy expenditure variable is used 71 observations are dropped as responses of Don't Know/Refused can no longer be used. In columns 3-5, 8
and 10 where the log of energy expenditure is taken one observation is dropped for having a value of zero. When treating energy expenditure as continuous
224 observations involved taking the mid-point of a category. In column 9 6 observations had a predicted outcome probability less than zero. Variables
frequently significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported are (direction of association reported in brackets): located in Wales
(positive); jointly responsible for energy supply (positive); in the transport, food and accomodation sector (negative); turnover of £250,000-499,000 (negative); 
payment method - standard credit (negative, columns 6-10); and has read contract (positive, columns 6-10).
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categories £25,000-50,000 and £50,000+ are statistically insignificant may relate to the relatively small 
number of observations in these categories. Log energy expenditure is found to have relationship with 
service satisfaction significant at the 1% level in all the specifications in Table 4. Across the regressions 
a 1 percent increase in energy expenditures is associated with a 12.3-17 percent reduction in the odds 
of an MSB reporting higher satisfaction with their energy supplier’s overall service. Column 10 
demonstrates this result is robust to relaxing the proportional odds assumption. 
 
Table 4: Odds ratios for reporting greater satisfaction with an MSB’s current energy supplier’s 
overall service 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)# (10)#
Energy Expenditure: £500 or less 1.214 1.230 1.208
Energy Expenditure: £501-1,000 1.033 1.048 1.026
Energy Expenditure: £1-2.5k - - -
Energy Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.731* 0.729* 0.785
Energy Expenditure: £5-10k 0.653** 0.637** 0.676**
Energy Expenditure: £10-15k 0.571** 0.511*** 0.589**
Energy Expenditure: £15-25k 0.463*** 0.435*** 0.504***
Energy Expenditure: £25-50k 0.597 0.568 0.677
Energy Expenditure: £50k+ 0.838 0.667 0.988
Energy Expenditure: Don't 
Know/Refused
0.774 0.690 0.790
Continuous: Energy Expenditure (£500 
units)
0.997 0.996
Continuous: Energy Expenditure 
Squared (£500 units)
1.000 1.000
Continuous: Log Energy Expenditure 0.850*** 0.857*** 0.851*** 0.830*** 0.877***
Not switched in last 5 years - - - - - - -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 0.741** 0.729** 0.688*** 0.668*** 0.673*** 0.698*** 0.682***
No. Broker Approaches: None 1.274 1.162 1.353 1.288 1.175 1.315
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - - - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 0.956 0.933 0.955 0.944 0.985 0.999
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.931 0.879 0.863 0.878 0.942 0.962
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 1.065 1.116 1.078 1.010 1.236 1.115
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 1.399 2.063 1.371 1.419 2.041 1.572
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too many 
to remember
0.868 0.886 0.853 0.846 0.961 0.938
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 1.110 1.052 1.111 1.114 1.139 1.246
Main choice method: Broker - - - - - -
Main choice method: PCW/telephone 
service
1.015 1.023 1.064 1.004 1.050 1.022
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
1.166 1.193 1.184 1.184 1.162 1.132
Main choice method: Current supplier 
only
0.952 1.036 1.050 1.000 1.011 0.973
Main choice method: Other 0.357*** 0.380*** 0.358*** 0.353*** 0.394*** 0.349***
Main choice method: Don't know 0.889 1.119 1.122 1.009 1.075 1.195
Log likelihood -1453.51 -1356.57 -1352.27 -1349.43 -1342.2 -1423.99 -1330.05 -1325.31 -1439.27 -1340.45
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.026 0.080 0.021 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes# Yes#
Engagement Controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes# Yes#
N 1083 1011 1010 1010 1011 1082 1012 1011 1082 1011
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold indicates
the base category for categorical variables. # indicates only the categories in the control variables that showed some statistical significance in column 6 are
retained (specifically country, whether jointly responsible for energy, whether company is a franchise, whether has a smart meter, payment method and
whether read their contract were retained). Columns 1-8 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the odds are defined as the probability of an
MSB being more satisfied with their current supplier's overall service relative to the probability of being less satisfied. Columns 9 and 10 report odds ratios
from a generalised ordered logit model where a partial parallel odds assumption is allowed and the reported odds ratios relate to whether MSBs are Very
Satisfied with their current supplier's overall service or are less satisfied. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are reported, the variable was
not included in the relevant column's regression. In columns 2-4, 6 and 9 one observation is dropped for being perfectly determined. In columns 2-5, 7, 8 and
10 where a continuous energy expenditure variable is used 71 observations are dropped as responses of Don't Know/Refused can no longer be used. In
columns 3-5, 8 and 10 where the log of energy expenditure is taken one observation is dropped for having a value of zero. When treating energy expenditure as
continuous 224 observations involved taking the mid-point of a category. Variables frequently significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not
reported are (direction of association reported in brackets): located in Wales (positive); jointly responsible for energy supply (positive); payment method -
standard credit (negative, columns 6-10); and has read contract (positive, columns 6-10).
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Considering the 2015 data in Table D4, the relationship between electricity expenditure and service 
satisfaction appears somewhat weaker than the results for energy expenditure in 2014. While in the 
2015 univariate regression four of the electricity expenditure categories have reduced odds of 
reporting higher service satisfaction significant at the 5% level, when all the control variables are 
included (column 4) only two of the electricity expenditure categories remain significant at the 5% 
level. 
Turning to energy expenditures’ salience, it appears energy expenditures in absolute terms have the 
stronger association with service satisfaction. In a univariate regression the log of energy expenditure 
as a percentage of turnover is associated with reduced odds of higher service satisfaction at the 1% 
level.38 However, when log turnover and log energy expenditures are included as separate variables 
in the same regression, log turnover is statistically insignificant, while log energy expenditure has an 
association significant at the 1% level.  
Moving beyond energy expenditures, an interesting result in 2014 is that having switched in the last 
five years is associated with a reduction, by up to a third, in the odds of higher service satisfaction, 
after controlling for the full range of engagement variables. That switching is associated with lower 
service satisfaction has a number of potential explanations. First, if price is the main determinant of 
switching it could be that firms attracting switchers offer a lower price by delivering a lower quality of 
service39. Second, firms that switch could be those with higher service expectations so the negative 
association results from the type of firms that are motivated to switch. Third, it could be that the 
switching process itself results in customer service issues. However, it may be inappropriate to place 
great weight on this finding, since no association exists between having switched and service 
satisfaction in the 2015 regressions (Table D4). 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
There are three main conclusions from the evidence presented in section 5. First, while there may be 
room to improve the retail energy market for MSBs, the descriptive statistics do not show clear 
problems, with one notable exception: the marketing of suppliers and brokers, with which there is 
clear dissatisfaction. Regarding MSB engagement, the survey evidence suggests that MSBs’ 12-month 
switching rate is noticeably higher than for domestic consumers. When evaluating MSB engagement 
the main point to recognise is that many firms have multi-year contracts and so only a subset of MSBs 
can switch in any given year. Assessments of MSB engagement either have to look at a longer time 
period, for example 5 years, or the 12-month switching rate must be suitably adjusted.  
Second, MSBs’ dissatisfaction with energy brokers is correlated with the number of approaches an 
MSB recalls having received in the previous 12 months. An increase in the number of approaches 
recalled is associated with a reduction in the odds of an MSB reporting a positive view of brokers. 
Significantly, this relationship is robust to the inclusion of a variable recording whether an MSB used 
a broker as the main method to select their current energy supplier. In other words, even after 
controlling for firms who obtained a useful service from brokers, the view of brokers is negatively 
affected by the number of approaches recalled. There is also some evidence that recalling a greater 
number of approaches reduces the odds of being satisfied with the ease of comparing prices in the 
market. 
Third, MSBs with low energy expenditures have higher odds of higher satisfaction with their current 
supplier’s value for money and overall service than those with higher energy expenditures. This 
                                                          
38 Again, for brevity, the full results are not reported. 
39 The quality variations would relate to customer support functions e.g. call centres and billing. 
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relationship is non-linear with there appearing to be a step down in satisfaction for moderate and high 
energy expenditures. The simplest explanation for this observation is that the salience of energy 
matters: if energy expenditure is low, a firm may rationally give little thought to the cost of energy 
compared to other aspects of running a business. The hypothesis is that as long as a basic service is 
provided these firms are unlikely to report negative satisfaction. These relatively high levels of 
satisfaction may also mean that low usage MSB customers are unlikely to engage in the market, and 
that these MSBs are comfortable with their non-engagement. That low usage MSBs are less likely to 
engage receives support from Table A1 where firms with higher energy expenditures are associated 
with a higher probability of having in the 5 years prior to the survey.  
Below three policy issues are considered in detail: (i) how policymakers should treat energy brokers, 
(ii) that Ofgem’s current survey only collects data from a subset of MSBs, and (iii) how regulators can 
maximise the benefits from customer surveys. 
6.1 Policy towards intermediaries 
Section 5 makes MSBs’ widespread annoyance with brokers and, in particular, the number of 
marketing approaches, clear. Equally, Appendix A shows firms using a broker as their main choice 
method are associated with being more likely to have switched. This suggests the core regulatory task 
is limiting the quantity of unsolicited broker contact, while preserving the value of brokers for those 
firms choosing to use them. 
MSBs’ dissatisfaction with broker and energy suppliers’ sales approaches is particularly notable as one 
of the CMA’s proposed remedies for the MSB energy market is a database of ‘disengaged’ 
microbusinesses’ contact details40 that rival suppliers could access so as to send microbusinesses 
marketing materials to encourage them to switch. While suppliers and brokers are distinct, our 
evidence suggests the quantity of marketing contact is key to MSBs’ dislike of brokers. If the 
disengaged database leads to a large quantity of additional marketing contact, even if from suppliers 
rather than brokers, it seems likely to generate negativity among MSBs. Also, the distinction between 
the marketing of suppliers and brokers should not be overplayed: Figure 3 shows that MSBs’ 
satisfaction with the sales approach of suppliers is also negatively skewed. Where the distinction 
between suppliers and brokers may be more meaningful is that there are fewer suppliers than 
brokers/intermediaries which may lead to a lower a volume of marketing contact. However, Table 1 
shows that even a moderate increase in broker contact, from 1-5 approaches to 6-10 approaches is 
associated with more than a 40% drop in the odds of reporting a more positive opinion of brokers. 
These results indicate that if Ofgem proceeds with the database proposal they need to choose a design 
that provides the most relevant information and the greatest prompt to act on this information while 
also minimising the quantity of contact. 
Two features of the database proposal potentially limit MSBs’ annoyance, although, they also likely 
limit its ability to increase engagement. First, disengaged customers have the opportunity to opt-out 
from the database. Second, the proposed marketing communications involve letters41; throwing a 
letter in the bin is probably less frustrating than dealing with a cold caller. Nevertheless, it is striking 
that the CMA seems to have largely overlooked the evidence on MSBs’ dissatisfaction with brokers’ 
marketing contact. The CMA’s approach is consistent with an assumption that remedies in the 
domestic market can be straightforwardly applied to the MSB market. The evidence in this paper 
suggests such an assumption is not appropriate.  
                                                          
40 Pg1193-1204, CMA (2016a) 
41 Para 17.241(b)(vi), pg1200, CMA (2016a) 
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The current paper’s evidence also suggests that greater regulation of energy brokers may be beneficial 
if it can separate brokers’ useful search services from the nuisance of their marketing efforts. The CMA 
backed away from directly intervening in intermediaries’ information provision on the basis that 
Ofgem would introduce a Code of Practice42 for intermediaries backed by a licence condition requiring 
suppliers only work with code-accredited intermediaries. As of December 2018, it is unclear where 
Ofgem has reached with this Code of Practice.  
Regarding stronger regulatory interventions, one possibility could be to offer MSBs the ability to join 
a list opting out of unsolicited phone contact by brokers. The main concern with such an approach is 
that it could reduce switching and leave firms paying more for their energy. However, the seriousness 
of this concern depends on the proportion of switching resulting from cold-calling.43 Understanding 
how MSBs choose the broker they use to actually switch would seem important, but this question is 
not addressed by the current Ofgem surveys. The more that switches are linked to MSBs pro-actively 
seeking out a broker, the lower are the risks from an opt-out list. 
Rather than tackling the volume of broker contact directly, the CMA placed importance on the type of 
intermediaries MSBs use to navigate the market. The CMA concluded that increased price 
transparency44 from energy suppliers would not only enable MSBs to bypass brokers but also 
encourage price comparison websites (PCWs) to enter the market.45 This seems based on the premise 
that price transparency will encourage ‘good’ intermediaries (PCWs) to supplant ‘bad’ intermediaries 
(poorly behaved brokers). While not an unreasonable premise, it is not certain that brokers will exit 
the market as intended, indeed, if they face declining business, in the short run they may even increase 
the quantity of their marketing activity in an attempt to attract business. Furthermore, the proposal 
relies on any online intermediaries which benefit from receiving supplier tariffs not engaging in 
‘excessive’ marketing contact, something which is difficult to guarantee without regulatory oversight.  
6.2 Defining the population of MSBs 
When surveying domestic energy consumers the population of interest is relatively well defined as 
the population of households in the UK.46 In contrast, defining the MSB population depends on the 
policy emphasis. since 2014 Ofgem MSB surveys have explicitly required respondents to be on a non-
domestic contract that they control directly. While this emphasis is reasonable (contract type affects 
the extent of regulatory protections), it creates a blind spot. By only sampling firms with non-domestic 
supply contracts the current methodology does not allow one to answer the following questions:  
1. What factors influence whether an MSB purchases energy through a domestic or non-domestic 
contract?  
2. Do many MSBs consciously choose between the two contract types?  
3. Do regulatory issues arise from having similar MSBs using different contract types? 
                                                          
42 Pg1209, CMA (2016a) 
43 One assumes cold calling generates sufficient switches (and commissions) to be profitable for the brokers 
involved. 
44 Pg1143-1169, CMA (2016a) 
45 As an alternative to providing details of tariffs on their own website, the CMA allows for suppliers to instead 
provide them to “third party online platforms”, see paragraph 17.18, pg1144, CMA (2016a). 
46 Although there may still be sampling choices regarding households where landlords purchase energy and/or 
households that are ‘off-grid’. 
26 
 
4. Does running an MSB from a home influence how the household engages with the domestic 
energy market? 
Using data from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skill’s 2014 Small Businesses Survey, 
BMG (2015)47 reports that the percentage of MSBs on non-domestic contracts varies by firms’ sector 
and number of employees. According BMG (2015) the total population of firms with 49 or fewer 
employees is 2.1m, but the population on non-domestic contracts is only 940,000. The issue is most 
dramatic for firms with no employees where only 28.6% use a non-domestic contract and the 
construction sector where only 23.1% use a non-domestic contract. Even among firms with 10-49 
employees, 23.7% are judged to use domestic energy contracts. Overall, focusing on firms with non-
domestic contracts implies a skew towards larger and, therefore, more established firms. If start-ups 
are thought to warrant a policy focus, for example, due to the role in economic growth, this may be a 
problem. Indeed, an issue unexplored by the survey is whether interactions with energy suppliers/the 
energy market (beyond high wholesale energy prices) ever impede firm growth. 
6.3 Maximising the value of market monitoring surveys 
For successful regulatory decision making it is essential that regulators have access to high quality data 
and analysis. High quality data and analysis should enable better decision making, leading to better 
outcomes for consumers, while poor or unexploited data risks regulatory mistakes. The current 
paper’s findings regarding the dislike of broker contact illustrates the benefit of enabling wider access 
to datasets commissioned by regulators in terms of enabling new insights to be robustly identified 
through more in-depth analysis than the use of descriptive statistics. 
As highlighted in Section 2, both Ofgem and Ofcom perform regular SME engagement surveys and UK 
regulators also perform regular surveys of domestic consumers. Since each survey is a costly exercise 
involving public money it is important to maximise the value and insights from these surveys. We 
suggest that to do this there should be a presumption that anonymised survey data commissioned by 
regulators is shared wherever legally possible. Where survey data cannot be shared, a public 
explanation should be provided.48 
Ofgem and Ofcom are currently inconsistent in their approaches to sharing raw survey data. The 
current paper was made possible by Ofgem providing special access to its 2014 and 2015 surveys, 
although the identity of firms’ energy suppliers was removed from the dataset made available to the 
authors. In contrast, raw survey data from Ofcom’s 2016 SME can be freely downloaded from Ofcom’s 
website, including the identity of SMEs’ telecoms service providers.49 Ofcom’s data sharing indicates 
at least one UK regulator believes the sharing of such data is legal.  
The benefits of data sharing are twofold: (i) increased regulator transparency, and (ii) maximising the 
return on investment from surveys. Major government/national survey datasets are already routinely 
shared through the UK Data Archive50 and it would seem sensible for regulators’ survey datasets to be 
made available through this managed route. Such an approach would be in keeping with the 
government’s Open Data White Paper of 2012.51 While a regulator may have limited resources to 
interrogate datasets, allowing routine access to researchers and other parties should increase the use 
                                                          
47 See Figure 3.2. 
48 Simply stating that a dataset “cannot be shared for legal reasons” lacks sufficient detail. 
49 See: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/multi-sector-research/general-
communications/consumer-experience/sme-research (data accessed on 15/2/18). 
50 See http://data-archive.ac.uk/ 
51 HM Government (2012). 
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of sophisticated statistical techniques to provide new and robust insights that can inform regulatory 
decisions.  
It is notable that the CMA energy market investigation appears not to have used the raw data from 
Ofgem’s 2014 MSB survey. Indeed, the CMA sometimes suggests evidence was unavailable to assess 
particular claims. For example, regarding whether larger firms were more likely to be contacted by 
brokers, the CMA states: “The 2014 survey did not provide a breakdown of the number of approaches 
by business size”52. Our analysis shows this is not strictly true: while the 2014 survey report (BMG, 
2015) may not have broken down the number of approaches by business size, the raw data does 
enable this question to be answered. Having a common approach to data sharing across UK regulators 
may help to avoid this type of error. 
Detailed exploration of survey data may also reveal methodological improvements to surveys. For 
example, the present analysis shows there are advantages to recording as many variables as possible 
in continuous rather than categorical form. Recording a potentially continuous variable as a 
categorical variable results in a loss of information. If possible, a survey should first seek a specific 
number as an answer, before using categories as a prompt for less informed respondents. In 
particular, only by collecting data for electricity and gas expenditures in a continuous can total energy 
expenditure variable be reliably constructed.  
7. Appendices 
Appendix A – Factors associated with having switched 
A1 A logit model for switching 
To analyse factors associated with firms switching in the five years prior to interview a logit model is 
used. The dependent variable, 𝑧𝑖, takes a value of 1 when a firm has switched energy supplier at least 
once and a value of 0 when a firm has not switched.53 For each firm the probability, pi, of at least one 
switch having occurred is:  
 
𝑧𝑖 = {
1     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦             𝑝𝑖
0      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦      1 − 𝑝𝑖
} 
 
where the probability of a switch having taken place, pi, is modelled as: 
 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑧𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝒊) = 𝐹(𝒙𝒊′𝜸) 
 
Here pi is the probability a switch has occurred given the vector of explanatory values for firm i, 𝒙𝒊. 
This probability can be expressed as a function of 𝒙𝒊 multiplied by the coefficients for each variable 
found through the regression process, 𝜸. Using the logit model assumes the error process for the 
latent variable behind the model is logistically distributed and 𝐹(. ) is the logistic cumulative 
distribution function. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
                                                          
52 Paragraph 105, pg34, CMA (2016b). 




In Table A1 average marginal effects are reported indicating the average percentage point increase in 
the probability of a switch having occurred associated with a change in a particular explanatory 
variable.  
 
When interpreting the switching regressions the risk of reverse causality needs to be recognised. The 
dependent variable refers to switching behaviour over the five years prior to interview, while the 
explanatory variables refer to the time of interview or the 12 months before it. This issue is particularly 
likely for some of the engagement control variables. For example, while a respondent reporting having 
recently read their contract may indicate a savvy respondent who is particularly likely to have 
switched, it could also be that switching makes a respondent more likely to read their contract as they 
want to check their new contract details are correct. Due to the large number of variables potentially 
suffering from this issue and the limited data available we do not attempt any correction.  
 
A2 Likelihood of switching in the last 5 years 
When debating the marketing methods of energy brokers and whether there should be additional 
regulation, the first thing to note from Table A1 is that a firm using any method other than a broker 
as the main method to select their current energy supply deal is associated with a reduction in the 
probability of having switched. Consulting a range of suppliers rather than using a broker as the main 
choice method reduces the probability of having switched by 18.5-19.8 percentage points (columns 4 
to 7 of Table A1), significant at the 1% level. A firm only engaging with their current supplier is 
associated with the probability of having switched falling by 38.4-42.0 percentage points. This 
confirms the important association between broker use and MSB switching. 
The next question is whether receiving a large amount of contact from brokers stimulates switching. 
In our data, receiving a large number of broker approaches, i.e. more than 6, is not associated with a 
higher probability of having switched compared to receiving 1-5 broker approaches. This lack of 
significance is shown in both the univariate regression (column 5, Table B6) and the multivariate 
regressions in Table A1. However, recalling no broker approaches in the last 12 months is associated 
with a drop in the probability of having switched in the univariate regression and in the multivariate 
regressions where only firm demographic controls are included (columns 3 and 5, Table A1). Where 
the number of broker approaches is the only variable beyond the firm demographic controls (column 
3), receiving no broker approaches is associated with an 11.0 percentage point drop in the probability 
of having switched in the previous 5 years, significant at the 5% level. However, this statistical 
significance is lost when the full set of engagement controls is included. Overall, these results suggest 
that limiting, but not banning, broker communications may have a limited negative impact on 
switching.    
Turning to the association between energy expenditure and having switched, the existing literature 
from the residential energy market (e.g. Deller et al, 2017; Waddams Price and Zhu, 2016; Flores and 
Waddams Price, 2013) suggests firms with higher energy expenditures (who, on average, are likely to 
have larger savings) are more likely to switch.54 This is because firms with higher energy expenditures 
will have greater returns to allocating a fixed amount of time to seeking cheaper energy.  
The results in Tables A1 and B4 provide partial support for this idea. While there is some evidence of 
a positive association between energy expenditure and having switched, it appears non-linear. 
                                                          
54 Assuming they are not already with the cheapest supplier. 
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Looking at the univariate regressions in Table B4, energy expenditure as a continuous linear variable 
is statistically significant at the 5%, but the log of energy expenditure is significant at the 1% level.  
Comparing columns 4-5 with columns 1-3 in Table A1, once the main choice method is included in the 
regressions the statistical significance of energy expenditure effectively disappears. This is perhaps 
unsurprising if we think different forms of engagement (e.g. comparing prices through a broker and 
switching) are strongly correlated, but energy expenditures are a motivation for firms to engage. In 
other words, if a firm has used a broker, knowing a firm’s energy expenditure adds no additional 
information about the likelihood of switching, but higher energy expenditures may nevertheless 
increase the likelihood of both using a broker and switching. 
The results based on the 2015 data in Table D5 largely mirror the 2014 results. One notable feature of 
the 2015 results is the number of employees has a statistically significant relationship with having 
switched, even after controlling for other factors.55 In 2015, having more than 5 employees, compared 
to having no employees, is associated with an increase of at least 14 percentage points in the 
probability of having switched in the previous five years, significant at the 1% level.56 
                                                          
55 In 2014, while a continuous number of employees variable is significant at the 1% level in a univariate 
regression (column 5, table B1), the same variable was insignificant at the 10% level in all the regressions in 
Table A1. 
56 When all the engagement controls are included (column 8, Table D4), the significance level of having 10-49 




Table A1: Average Marginal Effects on the Probability of Having Switched in the Previous 5 Years 
Appendix B – 2014 Univariate Regression Results 
In tables B1-B7, columns 1-4 report odds ratios from univariate ordered logit regressions where the 
ratios relate to the odds of being in a higher satisfaction category/having a more positive opinion. 
Column 5 in each table reports the average marginal effect on the probability of having switched 
supplier at least once in the previous five years. 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Energy Expenditure: £500 or less -0.083 -0.049
Energy Expenditure: £501-1,000 0.055 0.066
Energy Expenditure: £1-2.5k - -
Energy Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.094** 0.074*
Energy Expenditure: £5-10k 0.114** 0.075*
Energy Expenditure: £10-15k 0.115* 0.065
Energy Expenditure: £15-25k 0.129* 0.065
Energy Expenditure: £25-50k 0.057 -0.038
Energy Expenditure: £50k+ 0.013 -0.008
Energy Expenditure: Don't 
Know/Refused 0.046 0.022
Continuous: Log Energy Expenditure 0.033** 0.031** 0.016 0.015 0.012
No. Broker Approaches: None -0.110** -0.087* -0.048 -0.045
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 -0.001 0.005 0.008 -0.001
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 -0.007 0.018 0.005 0.023
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.017 0.040 0.036 0.049
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 -0.072 -0.048 -0.074 -0.045
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too -0.015 -0.009 -0.016 0.001
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know -0.039 0.026 0.027 0.060
Main choice method: Broker - - - -
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service -0.096** -0.093** -0.090** -0.091**
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers -0.187*** -0.190*** -0.185*** -0.198***
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
-0.420*** -0.419*** -0.396*** -0.384***
Main choice method: Other -0.223** -0.209** -0.233*** -0.212**
Main choice method: Don't know -0.415*** -0.426*** -0.342*** -0.355***
Log likelihood -654.11 -616.67 -613.51 -556.57 -553.54 -568.31 -534.92
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Engagement Controls No No No No No Yes Yes
N 1079 1008 1008 1008 1008 1078 1007
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1%
level. Bold indicates the base category for categorical variables. The figures reported are average marginal effects associated with the
probability of a firm having switched in the 5 years prior to interview. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are reported, the
variable was not included in the column's regression. 71 observations are dropped in columns 2 to 5 and 7 as responses of Don't
Know/Refused can no longer be used when energy expenditure is treated as continuous. When treating energy expenditure as continuous 224
observations involved taking the mid-point of a category. Variables frequently significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not
reported are (direction of association in brackets): with single supplier (negative), survey referenced gas supply (negative, columns 1-3) and
turnover - £1-1.5m (positive, columns 1-5); the following variables were only significant in columns 6 and 7: sector - business services
(positive), payment method - standard credit (negative), payment method - prepayment/other (positive), does not know when contract ends
(negative) and does not have a fixed term contract (negative). In all columns one observation was dropped due to 'Franchise: Don't Know'
perfectly predicting not switching and two or three observations were dropped for 'Single Supplier: Unsure' perfectly predicting switching. In




Table B1 – Univariate regressions on number of employees 
 
Table B2: Univariate regressions on turnover 
(1) Overall 
view of energy 
brokers












in Last 5 Years
Continuous Variable
Number of Employees: 1.023*** 1.004 1.002 1.004 0.005***
No. of Observations 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083
Categorical Variable
Base Category: Employees: None
Employees: 1-4 0.896 0.978 1.180 1.091 0.080*
Employees: 5-9 0.829 0.927 1.169 0.968 0.159***
Employees: 10-49 1.359* 0.950 1.100 0.989 0.168***
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.004 0.972 0.778 0.849 0.001
No. of Observations 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Columns 1-
4 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the ratios relate to the odds of reporting higher satisfaction/a more positive opinion, column 5
reports average marginal effects on the probability of switching from a binary logit model. The odds ratios/average marginal effect for the continuous













(4) Satisfaction with 
market's ease of 
comparing prices
(5) Switched 
in Last 5 
Years
Continuous Variable
Turnover (£100k units) 1.010* 1.004 0.999 1.002 0.003**
Turnover Squared (£100k units) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.000
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.055 0.561 0.394 0.587 0.015
No. of Observations 807 807 807 807 807
Categorical Variable
 Turnover: Below £73k 1.115 1.012 0.878 0.990 -0.043
Turnover: £73-99k 1.152 1.376 1.204 1.599 -0.180*
Base Category - Turnover: £100-249k
Turnover: £250-499k 0.932 0.670** 0.768 0.842 0.007
Turnover: £500-999k 1.181 1.075 0.951 1.229 0.069
Turnover: £1-1.5m 1.756** 1.282 0.991 0.992 0.229***
Turnover: £1.5-2.8m 0.956 1.015 0.976 0.737 0.089
Turnover: £2.8-4.99m 1.009 1.372 1.370 0.941 0.004
Turnover: £5-9.99m 3.035** 1.301 0.833 1.778 0.168
Turnover: £10m+ 1.057 1.257 1.160 1.319 0.201*
Turnover: Don't Know 1.394 1.063 1.077 1.403 -0.015
Turnover: Refused 1.017 1.105 1.086 1.240 -0.001
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.235 0.327 0.908 0.270 0.001
No. of Observations 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Columns 1-
4 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the ratios relate to the odds of reporting higher satisfaction/a more positive opinion, column 7
reports average marginal effects on the probability of switching from a binary logit model. When treating turnover as continuous 140 observations
involved taking the mid-point of a category. The lower number of observations when turnover is treated as continuous reflects the observations of don't






















in Last 5 
Years
Continuous Variable
Electricity Expenditure (£500 units) 1.006* 0.995 0.997 0.999 0.002**
Electricity Expenditure Squared (£500 
units)
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.000
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.086 0.275 0.629 0.964 0.112
No. of Observations 1014 1014 1014 1014 1014
Continuous Variable
Log Electricity Expenditure 1.056 0.862*** 0.894** 0.921* 0.045***
No. of Observations 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013
Categorical Variable
Electricity Expenditure: Below £500 1.066 1.105 1.033 0.996 -0.100
Electricity Expenditure: £500-1,000 1.115 1.064 1.071 0.977 -0.014
Base Category - Electricity 
Expenditure: £1-2.5k
Electricity Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.697** 0.642*** 1.042 0.773 0.038
Electricity Expenditure: £5-10k 1.332 0.606*** 0.625** 0.719* 0.113**
Electricity Expenditure: £10-15k 0.792 0.444*** 0.483*** 0.563** 0.125**
Electricity Expenditure: £15-25k 1.613* 0.677 0.594* 0.801 0.130*
Electricity Expenditure: £25-50k 2.463** 0.987 1.196 1.151 0.102
Electricity Expenditure: £50k+ 1.636 1.143 1.563 1.155 0.011
Electricity Expenditure: Don't Know 1.500 0.617* 0.640 0.678 0.024
Electricity Expenditure: Refused 0.313** 2.522* 3.363** 1.130 0.042
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.333 0.069
No. of Observations 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level.
Columns 1-4 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the ratios relate to the odds of reporting higher satisfaction/a more positive
opinion, column 5 reports average marginal effects on the probability of switching from a binary logit model. When treating electricity expenditure as
continuous 213 observations involved taking the mid-point of a category. When using log electricity expenditure one observation is dropped where
the electricity expenditure is £0. The lower number of observations when electricity expenditure is treated as continuous reflects the observations of




Table B4: Univariate regressions on energy expenditure 
 


















in Last 5 
Years
Continuous Variable
Energy Expenditure (£500 units) 1.003 0.995* 0.997 0.998 0.002**
Energy Expenditure Squared (£500 units) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.000
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.021 0.041 0.122 0.132 0.011
No. of Observations 1012 1012 1012 1012 1012
Continuous Variable
Log Energy Expenditure 1.084* 0.851*** 0.886*** 0.914** 0.047***
No. of Observations 1011 1011 1011 1011 1011
Categorical Variable
Energy Expenditure: £500 or less 1.083 1.299 1.141 0.985 -0.102
Energy Expenditure: £501 to £1000 0.998 0.985 0.971 0.876 0.034
Base Category - Energy Expenditure: £1-
2.5k
Energy Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.897 0.646*** 0.791 0.822 0.088*
Energy Expenditure: £5-10k 1.151 0.582*** 0.678** 0.631*** 0.122***
Energy Expenditure: £10-15k 0.967 0.522*** 0.607** 0.767 0.139**
Energy Expenditure: £15-25k 1.048 0.646* 0.549** 0.505*** 0.168***
Energy Expenditure: £25-50k 2.747*** 0.627 0.696 0.77 0.143*
Energy Expenditure: £50k+ 1.676 0.748 0.874 0.977 0.106
Energy Expenditure Don't Know/ Refused
1.169 0.788 0.823 0.710 0.04
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.093 0.005 0.134 0.176 0.008
No. of Observations 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Columns
1-4 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the ratios relate to the odds of reporting higher satisfaction/a more positive opinion, column
5 reports average marginal effects on the probability of switching from a binary logit model. When treating energy expenditure as continuous 224
observations involved taking the mid-point of a category and 71 observations are dropped where respondents refused to give their electricity/gas
expenditure or responded 'Don't Know'. When using log energy expenditure one observation is dropped where the energy expenditure is £0.
(1) Overall 















Base Category - Not switched in 
last 5 years
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 1.328** 0.882 0.715*** 0.958
No. of Observations 1083 1083 1083 1083
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance
at the 1% level. Columns 1-4 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the ratios relate to the odds of reporting




Table B6: Univariate regressions on reported number of broker approaches 
 
Table B7 – Univariate regressions on main method for choosing current deal 
Appendix C – Univariate regressions violating the proportional odds assumption 
Regressions in Tables B5 to B8 for the dependent variables (1)-(4) were re-run using the generalised 
ordered logit model. For almost all regressions the proportional odds assumption was not rejected at 



















in Last 5 
Years
Continuous Variable
Number of Broker Approaches 0.989*** 1.000 1.001 0.998** 0.000
No. of Observations 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028
Categorical Variable
No. of Approaches: None 0.862 1.203 1.034 1.414* -0.155***
Base Category - No. of Approaches: 
1-5
No. of Approaches: 6-10 0.543*** 0.918 1.028 0.723* 0.011
No. of Approaches: 11-20 0.353*** 0.949 0.875 0.791 0.013
No. of Approaches: 21-30 0.241*** 1.248 0.864 0.446*** 0.033
No. of Approaches: 31-50 0.160*** 2.035 1.351 1.307 -0.123
No. of Approaches: 50+/too many to 
remember
0.201*** 0.912 0.772 0.611*** -0.006
No. of Approaches:  Don’t know 0.507** 1.222 0.935 0.998 -0.060
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.000 0.702 0.493 0.000 0.032
No. of Observations 1083 0.001 1083 1083 1083
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1%
level. Columns 1-4 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the ratios relate to the odds of reporting higher satisfaction/a
more positive opinion, column 5 reports average marginal effects on the probability of switching from a binary logit model. The odds
ratios/average marginal effect for the continuous variable report the change associated with one additional broker approach. The lower




















in Last 5 
Years
Categorical Variable
Base Category - Main Choice 
Method: Broker
Main Choice Method: 
PCW/telephone service
0.277*** 1.384* 1.203 1.200 -0.120***
Main Choice Method: Range of 
suppliers
0.170*** 1.202 1.248 0.823 -0.184***
Main Choice Method: Current 
supplier only
0.191*** 1.238 1.176 0.852 -0.466***
Main Choice Method: Other 0.079*** 0.631 0.440** 0.513** -0.249***
Main Choice Method: Don't know 0.597 1.291 1.456 0.903 -0.475***
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.000 0.187 0.053 0.105 0.000
No. of Observations 1083 1083 1083 1083 1083
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1%
level. Columns 1-4 report odds ratios from ordered logit regressions where the ratios relate to the odds of reporting higher satisfaction/a more
positive opinion, column 5 reports the average marginal effects on the probability of switching in from a binary logit model.
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cases where the proportional odds assumption was violated. Even here, for categorical variables, the 















£5,000-10,000 In all instances the odds ratio remains less 
than one, but the effect becomes 
insignificant at the 10% level when the odds 









- In all instances the odds ratio remains less 
than one, but the effect becomes 
insignificant at the 10% level when the odds 









Not Approached When looking at being in the Very satisfied 
category the odds ratio is above 1. When 
the odds ratio concerns being above Neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied, the odds ratio is 









Not Approached When the odds ratio concerns being above 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, the odds 
ratio is less than 1. However, in all instances 










21-30 times Apart from when the odds ratio concerns 
being in the Very satisfied category, the 
odds ratio is below 1. However, in all 
instances the odds ratios are insignificant 
Ease of 
comparing 






- The overall statistical significance of this 
variable is driven by looking at the odds 
ratio of being above the Very dissatisfied 
category, which is significant at the 1% level. 
While all odds ratios are less than 1, being 
above the Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
category is the only other significant odds 
ratio, and here it is significant only at the 
10% level. 
Table C1: Instances in univariate regressions where the proportional odds assumption did not hold  
Appendix D – Results from 2015 
The following tables report regressions run using the 2015 data. The regressions have been specified 
so they match the 2014 regressions as far as possible, however, significant differences still remain. 
First, as the 2015 data does not identify whether the survey asked about an MSB’s gas or electricity 
supplier, unlike in 2014, we drop those cases where a firm uses both electricity and gas but each fuel 
is supplied by different firms. We only consider firms supplied by a single energy company. Second, 
the 2015 data does not include electricity expenditure, gas expenditure or the number of broker 
approaches as continuous variables. Third, as electricity and gas expenditures are categorical variables 
where the categories have varying widths it is not possible to create a combined ‘energy expenditure’ 




Table D1: Odds ratios for reporting a more positive overall view of energy brokers – 2015 data 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of employees: 10-49 1.628** 1.719** 1.597*
Electricity Expenditure: £500 or less - - -
Electricity Expenditure: £501-1,000 0.723 0.893 0.644*
Electricity Expenditure: £1-2.5k 0.805 0.814 0.724
Electricity Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.870 0.928 0.858
Electricity Expenditure: £5-10k 0.932 0.872 0.883
Electricity Expenditure: £10-15k 0.664 0.684 0.557
Electricity Expenditure: £15-25k 1.377 1.238 1.485
Electricity Expenditure: £25-50k 2.011 1.505 2.043
Electricity Expenditure: £50k+ 1.091 0.710 0.969
Electricity Expenditure: Don't Know 0.636 0.692 0.640
Electricity Expenditure: Refused 0.114 0.345 0.263
Not switched in last 5 years -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 1.083
No. Broker Approaches: None 0.758 0.754 1.101
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 0.566*** 0.541*** 0.599**
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.272*** 0.256*** 0.287***
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.150*** 0.143*** 0.148***
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 0.251*** 0.240*** 0.234***
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too many 
to remember
0.129*** 0.117*** 0.126***
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 0.447** 0.453** 0.574
Main choice method: Broker - - -
Main choice method: PCW/telephone 
service
0.341*** 0.273*** 0.252***
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
0.207*** 0.176*** 0.182***
Main choice method: Current supplier 
only
0.207*** 0.176*** 0.177***
Main choice method: Other 0.144*** 0.124*** 0.130***
Main choice method: Don't know 0.345*** 0.281*** 0.306***
Log likelihood -1338.37 -1359.01 -1314.63 -1325.87 -1238.94
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Engagement Controls No No No No Yes
N 957 957 957 957 956
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold indicates the base category for categorical
variables. Odds ratios from ordered logit regressions are reported where the odds are defined as the
probability of an MSB having a more positive overall view of energy brokers relative to the
probability of having a less positive view. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are
reported, the variable was not included in the relevant column's regression. In column 5 one
observation is dropped for being perfectly determined. The set of control variables differs to that in
the 2014 regressions due to the nature of the 2015 dataset. Variables often significant across
regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported are (direction of association reported in
brackets): sector - transport, food and accommodation (negative); turnover - £2.5-4.99m (negative);




Table D2: Odds ratios for reporting higher satisfaction with the ease of comparing prices in the 
market – 2015 data 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of employees: 10-49 1.119 1.118 1.134
Electricity Expenditure: £500 or less 1.467* 1.340 1.619**
Electricity Expenditure: £501-1,000 1.141 1.147 1.216
Electricity Expenditure: £1-2.5k - - -
Electricity Expenditure: £2.5-5k 1.165 1.125 1.236
Electricity Expenditure: £5-10k 1.348 1.316 1.441
Electricity Expenditure: £10-15k 0.859 0.877 0.913
Electricity Expenditure: £15-25k 1.311 1.254 1.378
Electricity Expenditure: £25-50k 2.022 1.808 2.244
Electricity Expenditure: £50k+ 0.670 0.683 0.704
Electricity Expenditure: Don't Know 0.928 0.920 0.973
Not switched in last 5 years -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 0.807
No. Broker Approaches: None 0.815 0.763 0.839
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 0.889 0.887 0.878
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.744 0.721* 0.698*
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.361*** 0.343*** 0.338***
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 0.683 0.585* 0.577*
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too 
many to remember
0.756* 0.774 0.787
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 0.806 0.916 0.995
Main choice method: Broker - - -
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service
1.390 1.291 1.323
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
1.023 0.937 0.960
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
1.128 1.058 1.078
Main choice method: Other 0.893 0.885 1.168
Main choice method: Don't know 1.321 1.152 1.208
Log likelihood -1505.94 -1513.01 -1474.09 -1482.69 -1460.1
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.012 0.575 0.002 0.037 0.001
Firm Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Engagement Controls No No No No Yes
N 957 957 957 957 957
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold indicates the base category for categorical
variables. Odds ratios from ordered logit regressions are reported where the odds are defined as
the probability of an MSB being more satisfied with the ease of comparing prices in the market
relative to the probability of being less satisfied. In columns where no figures for a particular
variable are reported, the variable was not included in the relevant column's regression. The set of
control variables differs to that in the 2014 regressions due to the nature of the 2015 dataset.
Variables often significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported are
(direction of association reported in brackets): turnover - £5m+ (positive); gas expenditure - has
connection, but below £500 (positive) and, in column 5, does not know contract end date or does




Table D3: Odds ratios for reporting higher satisfaction with current supplier’s value for money – 
2015 data 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Electricity Expenditure: £500 or less - - - -
Electricity Expenditure: £501-1,000 0.805 0.786 0.745 0.674
Electricity Expenditure: £1-2.5k 0.713 0.709 0.679 0.645*
Electricity Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.618** 0.621* 0.583** 0.548**
Electricity Expenditure: £5-10k 0.529** 0.524** 0.485** 0.452***
Electricity Expenditure: £10-15k 0.421*** 0.424** 0.429** 0.376***
Electricity Expenditure: £15-25k 0.356** 0.355** 0.330** 0.272***
Electricity Expenditure: £25-50k 0.526 0.460 0.438 0.376*
Electricity Expenditure: £50k+ 0.343* 0.326* 0.311* 0.300*
Electricity Expenditure: Don't Know 0.784 0.792 0.718 0.674
Not switched in last 5 years - -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 0.908 0.819
No. Broker Approaches: None 0.522*** 0.587**
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 0.706* 0.691*
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.900 0.873
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.757 0.669
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 0.934 0.986
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too 
many to remember
0.695** 0.724*
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 0.697 0.704
Main choice method: Broker - -
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service
1.108 1.132
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
1.383* 1.365*
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
1.491** 1.497**
Main choice method: Other 1.142 1.058
Main choice method: Don't know 1.017 1.097
Log likelihood -1384.82 -1372.63 -1363.68 -1346.69
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.051 0.460 0.294 0.019
Firm Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Engagement Controls No No No Yes
N 957 957 957 957
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at
the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold indicates the base
category for categorical variables. Odds ratios from ordered logit regressions are
reported where the odds are defined as the probability of an MSB being more satisfied
with their current supplier's value for money relative to the probability of being less
satisfied. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are reported, the
variable was not included in the relevant column's regression. The set of control
variables differs to that in the 2014 regressions due to the nature of the 2015 dataset.
Variables often significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported
are (direction of association reported in brackets): payment method - cash/cheque




Table D4: Odds ratios for reporting higher satisfaction with current supplier’s overall service – 
2015 data 
Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Electricity Expenditure: £500 or less - - - -
Electricity Expenditure: £501-1,000 0.870 0.865 0.867 0.781
Electricity Expenditure: £1-2.5k 0.713 0.743 0.752 0.716
Electricity Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.591** 0.621* 0.608* 0.563**
Electricity Expenditure: £5-10k 0.537** 0.609* 0.605* 0.546**
Electricity Expenditure: £10-15k 0.488** 0.590 0.628 0.554
Electricity Expenditure: £15-25k 0.449* 0.547 0.553 0.450*
Electricity Expenditure: £25-50k 0.657 0.764 0.785 0.674
Electricity Expenditure: £50k+ 0.255** 0.283* 0.297* 0.290*
Electricity Expenditure: Don't Know 0.579* 0.639 0.635 0.567
Not switched in last 5 years - -
Has Switched in Last 5 Years 0.921 0.869
No. Broker Approaches: None 0.638* 0.715
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 0.901 0.885
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.832 0.859
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 0.651 0.589**
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 0.809 0.837
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too 
many to remember
0.787 0.803
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know 0.642 0.643
Main choice method: Broker 1.000 1.000
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service
1.336 1.367
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
1.642*** 1.683***
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
1.938*** 2.017***
Main choice method: Other 1.260 1.185
Main choice method: Don't know 1.548 1.676
Log likelihood -1317.24 -1299.96 -1288.29 -1275.11
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.058 0.136 0.035 0.005
Firm Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Engagement Controls No No No Yes
N 957 957 957 957
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at
the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at the 1% level. Bold indicates the base
category for categorical variables. Odds ratios from ordered logit regressions are
reported where the odds are defined as the probability of an MSB being more satisfied
with their current supplier's overall service relative to the probability of being less
satisfied. In columns where no figures for a particular variable are reported, the
variable was not included in the relevant column's regression. The set of control
variables differs to that in the 2014 regressions due to the nature of the 2015 dataset.
Variables often significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported
are (direction of association reported in brackets): sector - construction (positive), has
not received a bill in last 12 months (negative, column 4), payment method -




Table D5 - Average Marginal Effects associated with the Probability of Having Switched in the 




Selected Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of employees: None - - - - -
Number of employees: 1-4 0.056 0.054 0.065 0.064 0.062
Number of employees: 5-9 0.151*** 0.143*** 0.160*** 0.154*** 0.144***
Number of employees: 10-49 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.143**
Electricity Expenditure: £500 or less - - - - - -
Electricity Expenditure: £501-1,000 0.082 0.061 0.056 0.033 0.035 0.018
Electricity Expenditure: £1-2.5k 0.094 0.060 0.049 0.021 0.016 -0.001
Electricity Expenditure: £2.5-5k 0.142** 0.111* 0.112* 0.082 0.090 0.074
Electricity Expenditure: £5-10k 0.146** 0.103 0.100 0.069 0.070 0.049
Electricity Expenditure: £10-15k 0.188** 0.140 0.120 0.089 0.073 0.056
Electricity Expenditure: £15-25k 0.262*** 0.211** 0.204** 0.178* 0.180* 0.151
Electricity Expenditure: £25-50k 0.089 -0.015 -0.041 -0.080 -0.097 -0.126
Electricity Expenditure: £50k+ 0.089 -0.024 -0.046 -0.103 -0.120 -0.135
Electricity Expenditure: Don't Know -0.002 -0.046 -0.050 -0.078 -0.077 -0.069
No. Broker Approaches: None -0.143** -0.131** -0.050 -0.031
No. Broker Approaches: 1-5 - - - -
No. Broker Approaches: 6-10 -0.032 -0.034 0.020 0.018
No. Broker Approaches: 11-20 0.046 0.036 0.065 0.058
No. Broker Approaches: 21-30 -0.037 -0.044 -0.005 -0.011
No. Broker Approaches: 31 to 50 -0.166** -0.182** -0.144** -0.140*
No. Broker Approaches: 50+/too 
many to remember
-0.034 -0.043 0.008 0.015
No. Broker Approaches:  Don’t know -0.110 -0.070 -0.010 -0.005
Main choice method: Broker - - - -
Main choice method: 
PCW/telephone service
-0.036 -0.035 -0.038 -0.034
Main choice method: Range of 
suppliers
-0.101*** -0.101*** -0.107*** -0.108***
Main choice method: Current 
supplier only
-0.380*** -0.385*** -0.384*** -0.371***
Main choice method: Other -0.283*** -0.298*** -0.286*** -0.252***
Main choice method: Don't know -0.300*** -0.315*** -0.319*** -0.279***
Log likelihood -594.74 -594.68 -548.34 -572.12 -565.47 -515.58 -510.8 -499.23
P-value, LR test joint significance 0.107 0.042 0.000 0.027 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Engagement Controls No No No No No No No Yes
N 957 957 957 956 956 956 956 955
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signifcance at
the 1% level. Bold indicates the base category for categorical variables. The figures reported are average marginal effects associated
with the probability of a firm having switched in the 5 years prior to interview. In columns where no figures for a particular variable
are reported, the variable was not included in the column's regression. One observation is dropped from columns 4-8 as gas
expenditure - £15-25,000 perfectly predicted switching and another observation is dropped from column 8 as payment method - don't
know/refused perfectly predicted non-switching. The set of control variables differs to that in the 2014 regressions due to the nature
of the 2015 dataset. Variables often significant across regressions at the 5% level or above but not reported are (direction of
association in brackets): sector - construction (negative), turnover - below £73,000 (negative), turnover - £500-749,000 (negative), gas
expenditure - £500-1,000 (positive), gas expenditure - £2,500-5,000 (negative), payment method - cash/cheque (negative, column 8),
does not know when contract ends (negative), and has read contract (positive).
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Appendix E – Firm Characteristics: Population Estimates vs Analysed Sample 
 
Figure E1: MSBs by number of employees 
 




Figure E3: MSBs by sector 
 
Figure E4: Electricity expenditures of MSBs using mains electricity57 
                                                          




Figure E5: MSBs’ energy expenditures 
 




Table E1: MSBs’ energy contract characteristics 
 






% with a fixed term 
contract
94.5** 92.4
% with a fixed 
contract lasting 2 
years or more
58.1** 53.9
% with smart meter 33.6** 29.6
% paying by Direct 
Debit
87.8** 84.6
% with a gas 
connection
40.4 40.1
% of firms in 
England
71.4 73.5
% with a single 
supplier
87.3*** 83
Note: Two-ta i l test of equal i ty between the statis tics of analysed fi rms
and the population estimates were performed: * indicates a di fference
statis tica l ly s igni ficant at the 10% level , ** indicates statis tica l
s igni ficance at the 5% level and *** indicates statis tica l s igni ficance at
the 1% level . Percentages are ca lculated including miss ing
observations  and Don't Know/Refused  responses  in the base.
Analysed Firms Weighted Population 
Estimates
% switched in last 5 
years
65.7*** 59.8
% switched in last 
12 months
26.3* 23.4
% recalls receiving 
bill in last 6 months
93.2** 90.9
% reporting no 
broker approaches
13.6*** 17.5





% Chose current 
deal through broker
28.3 25.9
% Knows month 
when contract ends
59.4** 54.6
% has read contract 52.8** 47.8
Note: Two-ta i l test of equal i ty between the statis tics of analysed fi rms
and the population estimates were performed. * indicates a di fference
statis tica l ly s igni ficant at the 10% level , ** indicates statis tica l
s igni ficance at the 5% level and *** indicates statis tica l s igni ficance at
the 1% level . Percentages are ca lculated including miss ing
observations  and Don't Know/Refused  responses  in the base.
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Appendix F – Analysed Firms’ Satisfaction with Suppliers and the Market 
 
Figure F1: Analysed firms’ satisfaction with their current supplier58 
 
Figure F2: Aspects of the market where analysed firms’ views are broadly balanced 
                                                          
58 The definition of the analysed sample means there are no N/A observations for those indicators used as 




Figure F3: Aspects of the market where analysed firms’ views show a negative skew59 
 
Figure F4: Analysed firms’ satisfaction with the ease of switching suppliers 
Appendix G - The possible impact of differential VAT rates 
As suggested in Section 5.3 an intuitive explanation for the non-linear association between energy 
expenditure and satisfaction is the salience of energy costs to MSBs. An alternative, but considerably 
more complex, explanation relates to the VAT regime for energy.  
In the UK there are two VAT rates for energy: 5% for domestic consumers and 20% for non-domestic 
consumers. For firms large enough to be VAT registered (in 2014 the turnover threshold for registering 
for VAT was £81,000), the difference in VAT should not matter as VAT can be reclaimed so that the 
effective rate is 0%. However, for non-VAT registered firms on non-domestic contracts whether the 
                                                          
59 In the survey the scale for Overall View of Brokers ran from Very negative to Very positive and N/A was 
replaced with Don’t Know. 
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5% or 20% tax rate applies depends on the quantity of energy they consume. 60 The change in VAT rate 
also coincides with the point where the Climate Change Levy is applied to qualifying firms.61 It could 
be that firms experiencing a higher headline price (due to the higher VAT rate/Climate Change Levy) 
are responding to the satisfaction questions about their current supplier without distinguishing 
between the part of the final price attributable to tax and the part controlled by suppliers. Looking at 
columns 1 and 6 of Table 3, the downward step in satisfaction occurs first for the category of £2,501-
5,000 which is roughly the point where VAT rises from 5% to 20%.  
Additionally, the differential VAT rates potentially make it harder for firms to navigate the energy 
market. It appears different suppliers take different approaches to applying the 20% VAT rate. EDF 
Energy applies the 5% rate automatically62 when consumption is low, whereas Gazprom applies the 
20% rate unless notified otherwise63. For firms who claim back VAT, price comparisons should be 
straightforward, as long as they ask for ex-VAT prices. For non-VAT registered firms, if energy suppliers 
do not make the VAT rate being applied clear in quotations two potential problems arise. First, if 
different energy suppliers quote prices inclusive of VAT, but use different VAT rates, it is possible that 
MSBs will fail to identify the supplier offering the lowest ex-VAT energy price. Second, if suppliers 
routinely quote the ex-VAT price64, there is a risk that those MSBs who are not VAT registered will 
experience ‘bill shock’, i.e. an energy bill higher than they expected, potentially leading to 
dissatisfaction. 
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